Augustine's rejection of the free-will defence: an overview of the late Augustine's theodicy

Couenhoven, Jesse

doi:10.1017/s0034412507009018

Cited by 10 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…There is disagreement regarding Augustine's stance on the relationship between free will and determinism. He is traditionally interpreted as a libertarian but some, such as Jesse Couenhoven (2007), argue that in his earlier work Augustine is a libertarian but then in his later work his writing on freedom he is much more of a compatibilist. Despite this debate, some key aspects of the traditional Augustinian theodicy do seem to assume a libertarian view of freedom; for example, it assumes that Adam and Eve had libertarian freedom (Couenhoven, 2007, p.280).…”

Section: Compatibilism and The Augustinian Theodicymentioning

confidence: 99%

Compatibilist Freedom and the Problem of Evil

Gillett¹

2018

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Section: Compatibilism and The Augustinian Theodicymentioning

confidence: 99%

Compatibilist Freedom and the Problem of Evil

Gillett¹

2018

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“…Though he had begun to question whether sinners have a libertarian freedom to achieve virtue and vice, he continued to take for granted that Adam and Eve must have had such agency. He still considered a version of the 'free will defense' a crucial part of Christian thought (I argue that he later rejected free will theodicy in Couenhoven 2007). Accordingly, he defi ned sin as "the will to retain and follow after what justice forbids, and from which it is free to abstain" (Augustine 1890: 11.14; this defi nition was to cause Augustine much trouble in the Pelagian debates about original sin).…”

Section: Augustinian Freedom: a Historical-developmental Accountmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Routledge Companion to Free Will

Timpe

Griffith

Levy³

2016

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Questions concerning free will are intertwined with issues in almost every area of philosophy, from metaphysics to mind to moral philosophy, and are also informed by work in different areas of science (principally physics, neuroscience and social psychology). Free will is also a perennial concern of serious thinkers, in theology and in non-western traditions as much as in contemporary academic philosophy. Because free will can be approached from so many different perspectives and has implications for so many debates, a comprehensive survey needs to encompass an enormous range of approaches. This book is the fi rst to draw together leading experts on every aspect of the debate, from those who are central to the current philosophical debate, to non-western perspectives, scientifi c contributions, and the rich history of the debate. Its 61 chapters, commissioned especially for this volume from the world's leading researchers, are framed by a General Introduction and brief section introductions for each of the six sections. A list of References, an annotated Further Reading list, and a short list of Related Topics are included at the end of each chapter.Kevin Timpe holds the W. H. Jellema Chair in Christian Philosophy at Calvin College. He has published a number of books on free will, including

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“…To achieve that, and following Augustine’s line of thought, a first step would be for therapists to help clients become aware that there are two levels of goodness of the will: the will is good as part of human nature, and good when morally good. 44 The will as a capacity can be known (as will) outside moral contexts: when you want to know if you have a will, when you want to know the answer to a question you are raising, when you want to know if you exist. 45 In Augustine, to know you have a will is prerequisite for the exercise of a good will, in the pursuit of understanding and goodness.…”

Section: Approaches To Treatment Focused On Ontological Formationmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Philosophical Concept of Deprivation and Its Use in the Attachment-Focused Treatment of Violence

Pârvan¹

2014

International Journal of Applied Philosophy

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Theories in both contemporary psychotherapy and ancient philosophy associate deprivation with wrongdoing and suffering, but operate with different under-standings of deprivation. The article will focus on two concepts of deprivation, one psychological and the other one ontological, as advanced by Bowlby in attachment theory, and Augustine of Hippo (354-430 CE). In attachment theory deprivation is something one suffers as a result of the others' actions (receipt of insensitive caregiving in early childhood); it has neuropsychological effects, it relates to violent behaviour later in life, and it is therapeutically treated mainly by emotional sensory work directed at attaining self-regulation. Understanding deprivation as Augustine does (i.e., diminishment of a being's inner unity and order caused by one's exercise of will) introduces a distinctive philosophical view on formation and can inform a type of reflective-behavioural work centred on forming impaired volitional and emotional capacities, and on reclaiming agency and responsibility both for what can be called self-deprivation and for ways to counter deprivation in offenders and victims.

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Augustine's rejection of the free-will defence: an overview of the late Augustine's theodicy

Abstract: Augustine is commonly considered the greatest early proponent of what we call the free

Cited by 10 publications

References 17 publications

Compatibilist Freedom and the Problem of Evil

Compatibilist Freedom and the Problem of Evil

The Routledge Companion to Free Will

A Philosophical Concept of Deprivation and Its Use in the Attachment-Focused Treatment of Violence

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