Aujeszky's Disease ELISA: Cross-reactions with other Herpesvirus Antisera

Banks, M.

doi:10.1016/0378-1135(89)90002-3

Veterinary Microbiology

1989

DOI: 10.1016/0378-1135(89)90002-3

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Aujeszky's Disease ELISA: Cross-reactions with other Herpesvirus Antisera

M. Banks

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Cited by 6 publications

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“…21 When explained, they are mainly attributed to crossreactions between different pathogens with antigens bearing common or similar epitopes. 2,9,13,16,17,23 In that case, false-positive reactions can often be reduced by adsorption of the serum samples with the cross-reacting antigen. 18 False-positive results can also be caused by a previous vaccination with the homologous antigen 4,20 or reaction with a contaminant antigen.…”

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confidence: 97%

Detection of False-Positive Sera in Contagious Agalactia with a Multiantigen ELISA and their Elimination with a Protein G Conjugate

et al. 1998

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In serology, lack of specificity can generally be attributed to cross-reactions between different pathogens with antigens bearing similar epitopes. During seroepidemiologic surveys of contagious agalactia of sheep caused by Mycoplasma agalactiae infection, numerous sera were analyzed by enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA). A few sera reacted with various antigens coated on plates, including the well with no antigen. This reactivity was not due to cross-reactions as initially suspected, and these multipositive sera were designated false-positive sera. Elimination of this false positivity was not possible by using covalent ELISA plates or different rabbit anti-sheep IgG conjugates. Only conjugates using monoclonal antibodies or protein G were efficient in elimination of false positivities without reducing the true specific positive titers. No false-positive sera have been observed since the implementation of protein G conjugates in the serologic diagnosis of contagious agalactia by ELISA for the past 2 years.

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confidence: 97%

Detection of False-Positive Sera in Contagious Agalactia with a Multiantigen ELISA and their Elimination with a Protein G Conjugate

et al. 1998

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Behavior in Multi-Unit Demand Auctions: Experiments with Uniform Price and Dynamic Vickrey Auctions

2001

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We experimentally investigate the sensitivity of bidders demanding multiple units of a homogeneous commodity to the demand reduction incentives inherent in uniform price auctions. There is substantial demand reduction in both sealed bid and ascending price clock auctions with feedback regarding rivals' drop-out prices. Although both auctions have the same normal form representation, bidding is much closer to equilibrium in the ascending price auctions. We explore the behavioral process underlying these differences along with dynamic Vickrey auctions designed to eliminate the inefficiencies resulting from demand reduction in the uniform price auctions.Key words: multi-unit demand auctions, uniform price auction, dynamic Vickrey auction, demand reduction, experiment.JEL classification: D44 (Auctions) * Research has been partially supported by grants from the Economics Division of the National Science Foundation. We thank Larry Ausubel and Peter Cramton for helpful discussions, Glen Archibald, James Peck, and seminar participants at Cornell University, University of Houston, University of Montreal, Ohio State University, University of Pittsburgh, Purdue University, and the University of Maryland conference on auctions, and three referees and the editor for helpful comments. Hui-Jung Chang, Juping Jin, and Scott Kinross provided valuable research assistance. We alone are responsible for any remaining errors. 2 1 Treasury bill auctions are often considered the canonical example of multi-unit demand auctions in which bidders have non-increasing demands. Policy debates regarding the optimal structure of Treasury bill auctions reveal a long history of confusion by a number of prominent economists regarding the incentive effects of uniform price auction rules (see Ausubel and Cramton, 1996). 3Spurred by the recent FCC spectrum auctions, theoretical research in multi-unit demand auctions reveals two distinctly different behavioral forces at work in auctions of this sort. In uniform price auctions, such as employed in Treasury bill auctions or in the recent FCC spectrum auctions, when bidders have non-increasing demand for homogeneous goods there is an incentive to reduce demand on some units in an effort to win other units at more favorable prices (see, for example, Ausubel andCramton, 1996 and Englebrecht-Wiggans andKahn, 1998). In contrast, when there are complementarities between items so that the value of a package of items exceeds the sum of its parts there are incentives for agents to bid above the value they place on any individual item (see, for example, Krishna and Rosenthal, 1996). Indeed, the recent FCC spectrum auctions have provided examples of both types of incentives: In the nationwide narrowband auction bidders appear to have had non-increasing demands, while in the broadband MTA auction there appear to have been complementarities between items (for analysis of the FCC auctions, see Cramton, 1995;McAfee and McMillan, 1996; Ausubel, Cramton, McAfee and McMillan, 1997).In this paper we experimentally...

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Auctioning the Airwaves: The Contest for Broadband pcs Spectrum

Chakravorti¹,

Sharkey

Spiegel

et al. 1995

Economics Manag Strategy

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The House and Senate of the United States Congress recently passed legislation that directs the FCC to establish a system for using auctions to allocate the use of radio spectrum for personal communications services. There is a unique and unprecedented set of issues that arise in this context, which are of interest to economists, industry analysts, regulators, and policymakers. We discuss these issues and evaluate their likely impact on the outcome of the spectrum auctions. In addition, we argue that there may be pitfalls in the auction procedure adopted by the FCC, and we discuss possible alternative procedures.

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Aujeszky's Disease ELISA: Cross-reactions with other Herpesvirus Antisera

Cited by 6 publications

References 13 publications

Detection of False-Positive Sera in Contagious Agalactia with a Multiantigen ELISA and their Elimination with a Protein G Conjugate

Detection of False-Positive Sera in Contagious Agalactia with a Multiantigen ELISA and their Elimination with a Protein G Conjugate

Behavior in Multi-Unit Demand Auctions: Experiments with Uniform Price and Dynamic Vickrey Auctions

Auctioning the Airwaves: The Contest for Broadband pcs Spectrum

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