Australian Cartel Regulation

Beaton–Wells, Caron; Fisse, Brent

doi:10.1017/cbo9780511974151

Cited by 25 publications

(7 citation statements)

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“…150 Since 2007, the maximum corporate fines associated with cartel conduct were changed to (1) AUD 10 million, or (2) three times the total value of the benefits obtained from the contravention, or (3) ten per cent of the annual turnover over a 12-month period if the benefits cannot be ascertained, and the maximum individual fines remained the same as before. 151 Although there was a gradual increase in the pecuniary penalty amounts after 1993, Beaton-Wells and Fisse argue that, until 2009, the civil pecuniary penalty regime failed to exert a sufficiently deterrent impact on cartels, 152 as judges seemed to be reluctant to impose penalties up to the allowable limit and showed sympathy to cartel participants. 153 Though the reasons for these behaviours are likely complex, they may reflect, in part, the cautious approach preferred by the Australian competition law enforcers to avoid or minimise false positives in law enforcement (outlined above).…”

Section: Threat Of Severe Sanctionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Comparing an Apple with a Pear? The Australian Immunity Program and the Chinese Leniency Program

Feng¹,

Fang²,

Lo³

2018

Bond Law Review

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The US introduced the cartel leniency program in 1978. In the past two decades, there has been a surge in the implementation of leniency programs in more than sixty jurisdictions. Although there have been numerous scholarly discussions to support the cartel leniency program, inconsistent views exist among different jurisdictions and stakeholders as to the effectiveness of the leniency program in practice. In evaluating new leniency programs, scholars and commentators have typically referred to the US and the EU models as benchmarks, but little attention has been paid to the question of whether it is desirable to apply these models in designing various leniency programs in different jurisdictions and societies. Given that Australia has recently revised its cartel immunity program for the third time, and that China's competition authorities have proactively relied on the leniency concept to combat cartels in the past few years and are currently drafting a guideline for more effective implementation of the cartel leniency program, the time is now ripe for an apple-versus-pear comparison of these two immunity/leniency programs so as to provide more insights into the different institutional designs of immunity/leniency programs. I Immunity/leniency Program in Competition LawCartel leniency programs, otherwise known as amnesty programs or immunity programs, 1 are an incentive-based mechanism used by competition authorities to combat cartels. These programs aim to destabilise cartels and to erode the collusion between cartel members by providing immunity from governmental penalties to cartel members who

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Section: Threat Of Severe Sanctionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Comparing an Apple with a Pear? The Australian Immunity Program and the Chinese Leniency Program

Feng¹,

Fang²,

Lo³

2018

Bond Law Review

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“…122 There must also be a relationship between cause and effect. 123 That is to say, the concerted conduct must result in altered conduct by the parties. 124 Significantly, in applying the 'concerted practice' provision, once the first two elements are proven a rebuttable presumption arises that concertation was followed in the market.…”

Section: A the European Standard Of 'Concerted Practices'mentioning

confidence: 99%

Pitfalls in Proving Price-Fixing: Are Price-Signalling Laws the Answer?

Cantatore¹,

Marshall²

2015

Bond Law Review

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Establishing a breach of the price-fixing prohibitions in Part IV Division 1 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010(Cth) ('CCA') depends on the apparently simple requirement that a 'contract, arrangement or understanding' to fix prices can be shown to exist between competitor corporations. However, proof of any such agreement has been problematic for the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (' ACCC') in actions for alleged price-fixing within a range of industries. This article considers the judicial interpretation of the terms 'contract, arrangement or understanding' and the type of evidence needed to prove that a pricefixing agreement exists. It also examines the scope and effect of the price-signalling provisions under Part IV Division 1A of the CCA and, in the light of international competition law jurisprudence, contemplates how these provisions may affect the ACCC's ability to prove price-fixing claims. Possible future directions in this area of the law, resulting from the recommendations of the recent Harper Review, are explored as well.

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“…131 The survey indicates that 42% of the public believe that cartel conduct should be a crime, and as of 2009 it now is. 132 In addition to the fines imposed in connection with the vitamins cartel, Australian authorities fined six participants in the air transportation cartel in 2008 and initiated proceedings against participants in the marine hose cartel in June 2009. 133 Australia has since aggressively pursued civil penalties -securing fines in the tens of millions of dollars, for example, in connection with a cardboard box and air freight cartel.…”

Section: Developments In Other Countriesmentioning

confidence: 99%