Authentic virtual others? The promise of post-modern technologies

Dotson, Taylor

doi:10.1007/s00146-012-0435-x

Cited by 11 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…Turkle (2007b) thinks that the authenticity of human relationships cannot be mimicked, and that machines can be evocative but not authentic. Dotson (2014) discusses virtual others, and also note "how easily social presence and attachment are evoked in human beings". He then proceeds to state that "[e]mbracing them [virtual others] … carries the risk of an undesirable shift in the collective conception of authentic sociality"; he thus shows how authenticity is a social construct, and that virtual others are "postmodern hyperrealities" that has the power to change our view of what is authentic (Dotson 2014).…”

Section: False Shared Intentionalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Dotson (2014) discusses virtual others, and also note "how easily social presence and attachment are evoked in human beings". He then proceeds to state that "[e]mbracing them [virtual others] … carries the risk of an undesirable shift in the collective conception of authentic sociality"; he thus shows how authenticity is a social construct, and that virtual others are "postmodern hyperrealities" that has the power to change our view of what is authentic (Dotson 2014). Handler (1986) sees "authenticity" as a "cultural construct of the modern Western world", and notes that it is strongly tied to western individualism.…”

Section: False Shared Intentionalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…If authenticity is to be a meaningful concept, it must refer to something other than being a human being, or alive. I side with Dotson (2014) when he proposes that "reality is meaningfully authentic due to the fact that it is not immediately pliable to one's whims and desires", and that "[a]uthentic others demand our engagement according to terms that are defined dialogically, emergent out of the meeting of at least two subjectivities" (Dotson 2014, pp. 16-17).…”

Section: False Shared Intentionalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Parasitic Nature of Social AI: Sharing Minds with the Mindless

Sætra

2020

Integr. psych. behav.

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Can artificial intelligence (AI) develop the potential to be our partner, and will we be as sensitive to its social signals as we are to those of human beings? I examine both of these questions and how cultural psychology might add such questions to its research agenda. There are three areas in which I believe there is a need for both a better understanding and added perspective. First, I will present some important concepts and ideas from the world of AI that might be beneficial for pursuing research topics focused on AI within the cultural psychology research agenda. Second, there are some very interesting questions that must be answered with respect to central notions in cultural psychology as these are tested through human interactions with AI. Third, I claim that social robots are parasitic to deeply ingrained human social behaviour, in the sense that they exploit and feed upon processes and mechanisms that evolved for purposes that were originally completely alien to human-computer interactions.

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Section: False Shared Intentionalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: False Shared Intentionalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: False Shared Intentionalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Parasitic Nature of Social AI: Sharing Minds with the Mindless

Sætra

2020

Integr. psych. behav.

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“…Yet humans may regard themselves as being in close personal relationships with carebots nonetheless, provoking discussion on whether carebots' design should incorporate simulation of relational capacities. Much of the ethical debate over the implications of creating non-sentient robots placed in intimate contexts with humans, whether as carebots or robotic sex dolls, centres on concerns over deception and manipulation of emotions (Coeckelbergh, 2012;Dotson, 2014;Sullins, 2012). Humans are positioned as vulnerable to robots' actions, which may be misinterpreted as real caring and empathy, whereas they are merely the programmed responses to stimuli embedded by designers (Coeckelbergh, 2012).…”

Section: Background: Technoethics Robotics Social Robots and A Potentimentioning

confidence: 99%

Sexbots

Mackenzie

2018

International Journal of Technoethics

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This article describes how sexbots: sentient, self-aware, feeling artificial moral agents created soon as customised potential sexual/intimate partners provoke crucial questions for technoethics. Coeckelbergh's model of human/robotic relations as co-evolving to their mutual benefit through mutual vulnerability is applied to sexbots. As sexbots have a sustainable claim to moral standing, benefits and vulnerabilities inherent in human/sexbots relations must be identified and addressed for both parties. Humans' and sexbots' vulnerabilities are explored, drawing on the philosophy and social science of dehumanisation and inclusion/exclusion. This article argues humans as creators owe a duty of care to sentient beings they create. Responsible innovation practices involving stakeholders debating ethicolegal conundrums pertaining to human duties to sexbots, and sexbots' putative interests, rights and responsibilities are essential. These validate the legal recognition of sexbots, the protection of their interests through regulatory oversight and ethical limitations on customisation which must be put in place.

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“…work as a whole (Decker 2008;Dotson 2014). However, the robotization discussions today are not dominated by the opinions of individuals but by broader ethical (Sharkey & Sharkey 2012) and juridical (Beck 2016) questions.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Robot use self-efficacy in healthcare work (RUSH): development and validation of a new measure

2017

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The aim of this study was to develop and validate a measure of robot use self-efficacy in healthcare work (RUSH) based on social cognitive theory and the theory of planned behavior. This article provides a briefing on technology-specific selfefficacy and discusses the development, validation and implementation of an instrument that measures care workers' selfefficacy in working with robots. The validity evaluation of the Finnish-language measure was based on representative survey samples gathered in 2016. The respondents included practical and registered nurses, homecare workers, and physiotherapists. A majority of the respondents were female. The full instrument consists of a set of six task-specific selfefficacy items concerning general views of technological skills, confidence in learning robot use, and confidence in guiding others in robot use. Three items were chosen for the shorter version of the measure. The face validity, construct validity, and reliability were established to validate the instruments. Both 3-item and 6-item measures were found to be highly consistent in structure. Respondents with high levels of RUSH also reported more general self-efficacy and interest in technology, on average. A very brief instrument of three items is convenient to include in repeated employee surveys.

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Authentic virtual others? The promise of post-modern technologies

Cited by 11 publications

References 19 publications

The Parasitic Nature of Social AI: Sharing Minds with the Mindless

The Parasitic Nature of Social AI: Sharing Minds with the Mindless

Sexbots

Robot use self-efficacy in healthcare work (RUSH): development and validation of a new measure

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