Authentication Schemes for Healthcare Applications Using Wireless Medical Sensor Networks: A Survey

Abstract

Many applications are developed with the quick emergence of the Internet of things (IoT) and wireless sensor networks (WSNs) in the health sector. Healthcare applications that use wireless medical sensor networks (WMSNs) provide competent communication solutions for enhancing people life. WMSNs rely on highly sensitive and resource-constrained devices, so-called sensors, that sense patients’ vital signs then send them through open channels via gateways to specialists. However, these transmitted data from WMSNs can be manipulated by adversaries without data security, resulting in crucial consequences. In light of this, efficient security solutions and authentication schemes are needed. Lately, researchers have focussed highly on authentication for WMSNs, and many schemes have been proposed to preserve privacy and security requirements. These schemes face a lot of security and performance issues due to the constrained devices used. This paper presents a new classification of authentication schemes in WMSNs based on its architecture; as far as we know, it is the first of its kind. It also provides a comprehensive study of the existing authentication schemes in terms of security and performance. The performance evaluation is based on experimental results. Moreover, it identifies some future research directions and recommendations for designing authentication schemes in WMSNs.

An Improved Lightweight User Authentication Scheme for the Internet of Medical Things

“…Many authentication studies have analyzed their performance in the following manner [ 9 , 10 , 11 , 12 , 13 , 14 , 15 , 20 , 21 , 22 , 24 , 25 , 26 , 27 , 28 , 29 , 30 , 31 , 32 ]. We compared each computation amount in terms of the research methods used.…”

Improved Gentry–Halevi's fully homomorphic encryption‐based lightweight privacy preserving scheme for securing medical Internet of Things

“…But majority of these contributed protocols failed in satisfying the security and privacy requirements of IoMT such as integrity, authentication, anonymity, untraceability, and perfect forward secrecy. 8,9 In general, knowledge, possession and inherent factor associated with the user credentials is considered as the input for the process of secure authentication. Specifically, the knowledge factor represents the values stored in the devices like the secret keys.…”

“…Over the years, several authentication protocols have existed in the literature to handling the issue of security and privacy that are associated with the data communication in the IoMT environment. But majority of these contributed protocols failed in satisfying the security and privacy requirements of IoMT such as integrity, authentication, anonymity, untraceability, and perfect forward secrecy 8,9 …”

REACH: Robust Efficient Authentication for Crowdsensing-based Healthcare

“…In 2019, Soni et al [23] proposed a three-factor authentication model for healthcare systems and claimed that it provides all the security requirements. However, Authors in [24] and [25] show that the scheme proposed by [23] cannot provide perfect forward secrecy.…”

“…Dharminder et al's scheme includes the followings: (1) Registration phase, (ii) Login and authentication phase, and iii Password change phase. We briefly, describe these phases as follows: Ravanbakhsh & Nazari [33] Utilized ECC a and Fuzzy Extractor Known-session-specific temporary information attacks Perfect forward secrecy [34] Li et al [36] Provides privacy and mutual authentication for TMIS Not provide user anonymity and unlinkability Impersonation attack [37] Giri et al [38] RSA-based authentication for TMIS Off-line password guessing Insider attacks Not provide user anonymity [39] Bin [40] RSA-based authentication for telecare systems Off-line password guessing attack Not provide perfect forward secrecy [41] Lu et al [10] Biometric-based authentication for TMIS, using ECC Off-line identity guessing attack Server impersonation attack Off-line password guessing attack [9] Mishra et al [42] Biometric-based scheme for TMIS Man-in-the-middle attack Not provide perfect forward secrecy [43] Li et al [19] Anonymity preserving authentication for WBAN d Not provide perfect forward secrecy Insider attacks [44] He et al [20] Secure authentication for WBAN Known-session-specific temporary information attack Denial of service attack [44] Sahoo et al [28] Biometric-based authentication using ECC insider attack Not provide anonymity [29] Sahoo et al [26] ECC-based authentication for TMIS replay attack password guessing attack [27] Gupta et al [3] Hash and Biometric-based scheme for WBAN, Known-session-specific temporary information attack Stolen verifier attack Not provide perfect forward secrecy Soni et al [23] Three-factor authentication using ECC Not provide perfect forward secrecy [24], [25] Aghili et al [13] Low computation cost authentication Not provide perfect forward secrecy Server impersonation attack malicios sensor attack [22] Masud et al [30] Low computation cost, hash and Xor-based scheme for WBAN Not provide anonymity insider attack impersonation attack password guessing attack [31],…”