Authoritarian Consolidation

Göbel, Christian

doi:10.1057/eps.2010.47

Cited by 38 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 49 publications

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“… 5 Other empirical evidence that authoritarianism breeds corruption comes from case studies of the late Soviet Union and Communist China (Grossman 1989; Bian 1994; Yang 1994; Ledeneva 1998). Despite their empirical richness, these studies are not generalizable to present‐day autocracies, constrained by economic interdependence with other countries, pressures from the international community, and advanced information technology (Morlino 2009; Göbel 2010; Goode 2010; Solomon 2010; Hale 2011). …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Does Authoritarianism Breed Corruption? Reconsidering the Relationship Between Authoritarian Governance and Corrupt Exchanges in Bureaucracies

Zaloznaya¹

2015

Law soc. inq.

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This article advocates for ethnographic and historical study of the political roots of corruption. Focusing on informal economies of Belarusian universities, it reexamines two theoretical propositions about corruption in autocracies. The first proposition is that authoritarianism breeds bureaucratic corruption; the second is that autocrats grant disloyal subjects corruption opportunities in exchange for political compliance. Using qualitative data, the author finds that autocracies can generate favorable as well as unfavorable preconditions for bureaucratic corruption. The author argues that lenient autocratic governance, characterized by organizational decoupling, creates favorable conditions for bureaucratic corruption. In contrast, consolidated autocracy, defined by rigid organizational controls, is unfavorable to such corruption. The author also concludes that in autocracies, disloyal populations may be cut off from rather than granted opportunities for bureaucratic corruption. These findings suggest that the relationship between autocratic governance and corruption is more complex than current studies are able to reveal due to their methodological limitations.

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confidence: 99%

Does Authoritarianism Breed Corruption? Reconsidering the Relationship Between Authoritarian Governance and Corrupt Exchanges in Bureaucracies

Zaloznaya¹

2015

Law soc. inq.

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“…Epstein et al (2006) find that age increases the failure probability after conditioning on GDP per capita. Göbel (2011) reviews the literature on autocratic consolidation. In our regressions, we found that controlling for county fixed effects can change the sign of the "new regime" coefficient, suggesting that fixed-effects estimation may be important.…”

Section: Endnotesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Commodity terms of trade shocks and political transitions

Janus

Riera‐Crichton

Tarufelli

2022

Economics & Politics

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In this paper, we estimate the effects of relative international commodity prices on political transitions accounting for time trends (since democracy might evolve in waves) and the fact that different autocratic regime types might respond differently. A standard deviation (2.1 percentage points) decrease in the growth rate of our 3-year moving-average relative price index increases the democratic transition probability by 0.5 percentage points or 13% of the mean probability. The transition probability moves nearly one for one with economic growth. Military autocracies might democratize after positive shocks. The autocratictransition effects are negative but insignificant.

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“…The third source of legitimation – ideational‐identitarian legitimation – may, to a certain extent, also be enhanced through e‐participation. Göbel (2011, 2013) argues that ideational legitimation has a strong discursive dimension: in order to create a collective identity, a compelling narrative needs to be conveyed to citizens (see also Lambach & Göbel, 2010; Von Soest & Grauvogel, 2017). E‐participation can be seen as a communicative tool to promote the position of the government, distribute a certain narrative and enhance the discursive power of a regime (Göbel, 2013).…”

Section: Theoretical Framework: E‐participation and Legitimation Strategies In Nondemocratic Regimesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why do nondemocratic regimes promote e‐participation? The case of Moscow's active citizen online voting platform

Schlaufer

2020

Governance

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Citizen online participation has become an increasingly important feature of policymaking in nondemocratic regimes. This article explores the question of why nondemocratic governments promote e‐participation tools. To address this question, this research examines the motives for the introduction of the Active Citizen e‐voting platform in Moscow through an in‐depth case study drawing on interviews and qualitative document analysis. The case study identifies a variety of objectives pursued by the Moscow city government with the promotion of e‐participation and relates them to three legitimation strategies, namely, input‐based legitimation, output‐based legitimation and discourse‐based legitimation. The results underscore how controlled e‐participation may combine different legitimation strategies without challenging the distribution of decision‐making power.

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Authoritarian Consolidation

Cited by 38 publications

References 49 publications

Does Authoritarianism Breed Corruption? Reconsidering the Relationship Between Authoritarian Governance and Corrupt Exchanges in Bureaucracies

Does Authoritarianism Breed Corruption? Reconsidering the Relationship Between Authoritarian Governance and Corrupt Exchanges in Bureaucracies

Commodity terms of trade shocks and political transitions

Why do nondemocratic regimes promote e‐participation? The case of Moscow's active citizen online voting platform

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