Why do autocrats financially repress some allies but not others during an economic crisis? When too many foxes are in the henhouse, an autocrat may purge his allies in bad times and shrink the winning coalition. However, it is a risky enterprise. If he targets the wrong elite, it may backfire and trigger coups and dissent. Despite the high risk, we still do not know much about precisely who autocrats are likely to sideline from the ruling coalition. I suggest that the autocrat’s business allies are a politically expedient target during economic crises because the people perceive the co-opted business elite as corrupt. Given their low public popularity, the autocrat may justifiably blame the greedy business elite for the country’s economic woes. To develop a framework for public support for repression, I focus on Turkey as a case – a highly polarized country that has experienced a protracted financial crisis. One novel contribution of this study is the use of visual conjoints. I created fake LinkedIn profiles of hypothetical businesspeople with AI-generated profile pictures and business logos. I measured people’s support for their financial repression, depending on their firm’s characteristics, sectoral affiliations, and partisan attitudes toward the government’s economic policies. The results suggest that public support for financial coercion depends on the regime’s political economy. People are more likely to condone the extra-taxation of the business elite, who owe their success to the regime and are perceived as responsible for the economic crisis. This paper contributes to a growing scholarship on micro-level determinants of autocratic purges, and its findings have broad implications for our understanding of elite defection and autocratic power-sharing arrangements.