Authority in Transnational Legal Theory

Abstract

Within these fields, there is no need to catalogue the range of phenomena that might be treated as instances of authorityfrom international institutions to transnational private norm-setting regimes and every shade of public/private regulator in between. The remaining questions surround the way in which such phenomena should be explained by theorists in the range of disciplines that share an interest in them; and the range of tests that might be used to evaluate them either independently, or in relation to more established forms of authority.Arguably, only the latter of these two questions should be of major concern. Though there is merit in conceptual and analytic precision, the reason authority has troubled theorists in moral, political and legal theory for so long is that it has considerable bearing on our practical lives, which must be explained and evaluated. This does not change when the target of evaluation is not authority but authorities. The problem of authoritieswhether plural, dispersed, fragmented or integratedis a problem of justifying their operation against the freedom of their subjects (individual and institutional) and justifying their relationships with other authorities with which they overlap. These normative questions arising from plurality of authorities are among the most pressing problems for theorists of transnational or global governance.To get to those questions, however, we need clarity about the sort of thing we are talking about.Developments across transnational legal and political institutions threaten to overwhelm or at least outpace conventional understandings of authority, and there is a very real need to clarify just what authority is before we can ask questions about who has it or test its legitimacy. In an era of transnational claimants (and possible possessors) of authority, it is especially critical, though more difficult, to be clear about what sort of thing authority is. Transnational claims to authority force us to confront questions such as: are private credit rating agencies authorities? Do private transnational bodies regulating forestry or labour standards have authority and if so, of what sort? What sort of power do hybrid publicprivate bodies have? Or more broadly, what is the difference, if any, between transnational law and transnational regulation? These questions in turn force us to address any ambiguity or variance in the concept of authority in a way that a more homogenous set of claimants such as states or even public international legal institutions do not. Analytic precision matters here because it affects the content and boundaries of the normative questions that follow. Is the authority wielded by international or transnational institutions or norms the same (in kind) as the authority wielded by states? If so, is authority in all contexts justified by the same reasons? Can/should/must we have shared criteria of legitimate authority to enable those authorities to be assessed comparatively? Answers to all of these questions have been offered with either ex...

Internet of Things, cybersecurity and governing wicked problems: learning from climate change governance

“…35 We see most benefit where there is effective coordination and collaboration within multilevel, multi-actor models, where they are more fluid and less restrictive than formal state-centric multilateral approaches based on legally binding rule making. 36 According to Black, a normative framework can help to support the emergence of customary practice between all actors contributing to a more predictable and stable, transnational, multilevel order. 37 The rationale here is that stability and predictability can foster more effective cooperation, resulting in a more resilient dynamic governance environment in which innovation can be perpetually nurtured.…”

The relativity of political authority: Overlapping claims and shared subjects beyond the state

“…These include more established yet still pliable categories of “transnational law,” (including both public and private international law regulating and transcending national borders (Jessup, 1956, 136)); indigenous law (e.g., Borrows, 2010, 33–66; Napoleon, 2013); the law of religious orders, customary law, or other phenomena of legality that do not owe their agency or authority to state recognition (Roughan & Halpin, 2017, 2–3). Their interactions are also the subjects of extensive literatures (e.g., see essays in Cotterrell & Del Mar, 2016; Muniz‐Fraticelli, 2014). These alternative or integrated claimants of authority include representatives of polities within the state who do not control the state's institutions as their own, but practice various forms of self‐determination, sometimes directly asserting these against the state.…”

Las invenciones laborales en las universidades. un debate en México, Chile y España

“…Se entiende autoridad como la facultad de influenciar la acción de otro sujeto o como la facultad para influenciar o determinar las ideas de otros sujetos (Friedman, 1973). Por su parte, Cotterrell & Del Mar (2016) proponen una concepción minimalista del concepto de autoridad, al entender que el estándar de esta es por lo menos ser escuchado con respeto, es decir, que el emisor sea tratado como alguien importante y que su mensaje debe ser considerado de forma seria.…”

“…En un segundo apartado analiza su intersección con la GG y la emergencia de regímenes privados, y en el último acápite, estudia tres aproximaciones mixtas a la autoridad privada en la GG. Por mixtas se entienden aquellas posiciones teóricas que, desde la diversidad del derecho transnacional (Benvenisti, 2014;Cotterrell & Del Mar, 2016;Halliday & Shaffer, 2015;Zumbansen, 2010), propugnan por el desarrollo de una agenda de investigación interdisciplinar en su aproximación al derecho en un contexto global. Las corrientes que se tratan son el derecho administrativo global, la autoridad pública internacional y las redes de gobernanza transgubernamentales.…”