Authorization and The Morality of War

Lazar, Seth

doi:10.1080/00048402.2015.1050680

Cited by 10 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…My understanding of presumed consent is thus different from the one offered by Fabre (155) and Lazar (5). I use presumed consent to refer to situations in which actual consent has been given or withdrawn, but we don't know which of the two is the case.…”

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confidence: 75%

“…36 The view defended here is of course premised on the rejection of Kant's idea that the only body capable of acting on behalf of a political community is its government (Flikschuh 2008;Korsgaard 2008, 254;Ripstein, 336;see also, Smith 2008). Insightful discussions of how the notion of authorization operates in this context are Finlay 2010;Lazar 2016;Benbaji 2018. 37 This paper was originally written for the 2015 ELAC Conference at the Stockholm Centre for the Ethics of War and Peace, and subsequently presented at Oxford, King's College London, Stockholm, UCL, Edinburgh, Manchester, Torquato di Tella, Catania, Oslo, the 2017 SIFA Conference in Pisa and the 2017 Pacific Conference of the American Philosophical Association in Seattle.…”

Section: The Symmetry View Revisitedmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The view defended here is of course premised on the rejection of Kant's idea that the only body capable of acting on behalf of a political community is its government (Flikschuh ; Korsgaard , 254; Ripstein, 336; see also, Smith ). Insightful discussions of how the notion of authorization operates in this context are Finlay ; Lazar ; Benbaji .…”

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confidence: 99%

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Revolution and Intervention

Renzo

2019

Nous

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Provided that traditional jus ad bellum principles are fulfilled, military humanitarian intervention to stop large scale violations of human rights (such as genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes) is widely regarded as morally permissible. In cases of “supreme humanitarian emergency”, not only are the victims morally permitted to rebel, but other states are also permitted to militarily intervene. Things are different if the human rights violations in question fall short of supreme humanitarian emergency. Because of the importance of respecting political self‐determination, in cases of “ordinary oppression”, we normally think that rebellion might be permissible, but not military humanitarian intervention. Thus, according to the received view, the conditions for the permissibility of intervention coincide with the conditions for the permissibility of revolution in cases of supreme humanitarian emergency, but not in cases of ordinary oppression. In cases of ordinary oppression there is an asymmetry between the conditions for the permissibility of revolution and intervention (call this the Asymmetry View). Should we accept the Asymmetry View? I answer this question by outlining an account of political self‐determination and by illustrating the complex role that this notion should play in discussing the morality of revolution and intervention.

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confidence: 75%

Section: The Symmetry View Revisitedmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Revolution and Intervention

Renzo

2019

Nous

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“…Whether one has a right to hire co-nationals over locals in scenarios where both lives' are at risk will depend on whether one is permitted to save the lives of co-nationals before others. Some claim this is permissible 33 and some claim it is not. 34 Even if it is not, it may be permissible to save the lives of friends, acquaintances, professional associates, and others before strangers.…”

Section: Survival Migrantsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Immigration Control as Self-Defense

Gerver

2020

Preprint

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This article defends the claim that citizens are justified in supporting immigration restrictions which are necessary to protect access to resources which (a) they have a claim right to and which (b) they and not migrants require to sustain their lives. Moreover, citizens are justified in supporting such restrictions even when it means blocking migrants' access to lifesustaining resources so long as (a) migrants lack a claim right to these resources and (b) the number of migrants seeking entrance is below a given threshold. Though citizens act permissibly in supporting restrictions in such cases, and act permissibly in voting for policymakers supporting such restrictions, the policymakers themselves often act impermissibly in implementing such restrictions. This is because the actions which citizens are justified in pursuing to defend their own lives are distinct from the actions which policymakers are justified in pursuing to defend the lives of citizens. Immigrants generally increase the medium wage of native workers, pay more in taxes than they use in resources, and contribute in countless non-monetary ways to the culture and intellectual life of their adopted countries. They also dramatically increase their own resources and liberties when given the option to migrate, creating a strong prima facie case for open borders. 1 Despite the prima facie case for open borders, the short-term impacts of immigrants can be lethal for some. Consider the case of Siama. On a rainy morning in March 2012, she was sitting on a sofa in her Juba home, comprised of a dirt floor, a couch, and straw walls. The only visible food was a sack of rice leaning against her west-facing fence, and she was unemployed, lacking nutrients necessary for survival. She decided that the government should limit the number of migrants entering and working in South Sudan. "Most jobs are in hotels, and most of the hotels are owned by Somalis, Eritreans and Ethiopians," she explained. "South Sudanese cannot get jobs." 2 Siama acknowledged that migrants might help the South Sudanese economy eventually, creating more jobs than they take. But this would take time, and Siama lacked time. To survive she needed a job as soon as possible, and so felt justified in limiting inward migration. This article considers whether and when citizens like Siama are permitted to support immigration control to defend their survival, and whether policymakers act permissibly in acting on behalf. More specifically, it considers whether citizens and policymakers act permissibly in restricting immigration to protect citizens' access to "adequate food, water, clean air, shelter, health, and a livable environment." 3

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“…10 10 For different causal and non‐causal accounts of complicity, see: (Gardner, 2006; Kutz, 2000; Lepora & Goodin, 2013). For a discussion of how we are wronged when others use shared resources and authority arrangements “in our name”, see: (Lazar, 2016, 215–16). …”

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confidence: 99%

Solidarity under duress: Defending state vigilantism

Viehoff

2021

European J of Philosophy

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May European Union (EU) member states, in the pursuit of enforcing the norms of ‘EU justice’, unilaterally adopt harmful policies that are ordinarily impermissible in the course of voluntary cooperation amongst democratic states? Though conditions of permissible vigilantism are strict and only rarely met, there are some basic EU duties the compliance with which each individual member state is permitted to enforce unilaterally. Such measures are sometimes permissible even if European community law says otherwise: to the extent that European law prevents states from enforcing these duties, it lacks authority.

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Authorization and The Morality of War

Cited by 10 publications

References 33 publications

Revolution and Intervention

Revolution and Intervention

Immigration Control as Self-Defense

Solidarity under duress: Defending state vigilantism

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