Autobiographical remembering: Narrative constraints on objectified selves

Barclay, Craig R.

doi:10.1017/cbo9780511527913.004

Cited by 92 publications

(71 citation statements)

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“…However, most of the empirical evidence exploring the structural and organizational features of trauma memories has relied on self-report methodology, which makes it vulnerable to a number of potential biases that threaten the validity of such research. Such methodological barriers have made it difficult to directly address the debate surrounding whether trauma memories are more "fragmentary and poorly organized" as has been suggested by some researchers (Barclay, 1995;Dalgleish, 2004;van der Kolk & Fisler, 1995;but see Porter & Birt, 2001;Shobe & Kihlstrom, 1997). Although examination of CED does not speak directly to the issue of memory fragmentation, the studies presented in this paper do suggest that trauma memories may indeed have special organizational characteristics (see Porter & Birt, 2001;Rubin, Feldman, & Beckham, 2003;Shobe & Kihlstrom, 1997), and these characteristics may extend to stressful, but non-PTSD memories, albeit to a lesser degree.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Stressful memories may be well-remembered due to unique structural and organization features in memory. Whether such memories lack proper organization and coherence (Barclay, 1995;van der Kolk & Fisler, 1995) or are overly integrated into the life story (Berntsen, Willert, & Rubin, 2003;Berntsen & Rubin, 2006), stressful memories appear to differ from everyday memories in their structural and organizational features (Porter & Birt, 2001). Degree of aberration in structural organization has been linked with both mental health outcomes (Foa, Molnar, & Cashman, 1995;Harvey & Bryant, 1999) and physical health outcomes (Pennebaker, Mayne, & Francis, 1997).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Memory and coping with stress: The relationship between cognitive–emotional distinctiveness, memory valence, and distress

Boals

Rubin

Klein

2008

Memory

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Cognitive-emotional distinctiveness (CED), the extent to which an individual separates emotions from an event in the cognitive representation of the event, was explored in four studies. CED was measured using a modified multidimensional scaling procedure. The first study found that lower levels of CED in memories of the September 11 terrorist attacks predicted greater frequency of intrusive thoughts about the attacks. The second study revealed CED levels are higher in negative events, in comparison to positive events and that low CED levels in emotionally intense negative events are associated with a pattern of greater event-related distress. The third study replicated the findings from the previous study when examining CED levels in participants' memories of the 2004 Presidential election. The fourth study revealed that low CED in emotionally intense negative events is associated with worse mental health. We argue that CED is an adaptive and healthy coping feature of stressful memories.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Memory and coping with stress: The relationship between cognitive–emotional distinctiveness, memory valence, and distress

Boals

Rubin

Klein

2008

Memory

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“…Equally important, a large body of evidence shows that people maintain detailed stores of behavioral episodes they have experienced (e.g., Barclay, 1996;Conway & Bekerian, 1987;Klein et al, 1989Klein et al, , 1997Klein & Loftus, 1993b;Klein, Loftus, Trafton, & Fuhrman, 1992;Nelson, 1993bNelson, , 1996Rubin, 1986;Singer & Salovey, 1993;Strauman, 1990). …”

Section: The Evidence For Independencementioning

confidence: 99%

Decisions and the evolution of memory: Multiple systems, multiple functions.

Klein

Cosmides

Tooby

et al. 2002

Psychological Review

397

372

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Memory evolved to supply useful, timely information to the organism's decision-making systems. Therefore, decision rules, multiple memory systems, and the search engines that link them should have coevolved to mesh in a coadapted, functionally interlocking way. This adaptationist perspective suggested the scope hypothesis: When a generalization is retrieved from semantic memory, episodic memories that are inconsistent with it should be retrieved in tandem to place boundary conditions on the scope of the generalization. Using a priming paradigm and a decision task involving person memory, the authors tested and confirmed this hypothesis. The results support the view that priming is an evolved adaptation. They further show that dissociations between memory systems are not-and should not be-absolute: Independence exists for some tasks but not others.Memory is a gift of nature, the ability of living organisms to retain and to utilize acquired information or knowledge. . . . Owners of biological memory systems are capable of behaving more appropriately at a later time because of their experiences at an earlier time, a feat not possible for organisms without memory. (Tulving, 1995a, p. 751) If there is one proposition on which all psychologists seem to agree, it is that memory is useful. Memory allows organisms to adjust their behavior on the basis of information they acquire ontogenetically, through their experiences with the world.This connection between personal experience, memory, and behavior implies a close relationship between learning and memory: "Memory in biological systems always entails learning (the acquisition of information) and . . . learning implies retention (memory) of such information" (Tulving, 1995a, p. 751). Recognizing this, psychologists have long exploited learning paradigms to study the properties of memory (e.g., by list learning to probe free recall, cued recall, and recognition).The same connection also implies a close relationship between decision rules 1 and memory. An organism cannot behave "more appropriately"-that is, more adaptively-at a later time because of experiences at an earlier time unless it is equipped with rules that use ontogenetically acquired information to make decisions. Indeed, memory systems must have evolved their structure in response to the informational needs of the decision rules guiding behavior. This is because memory properties that have no impact on an organism's decisions will not be visible to-and hence will not be shaped by-selection. Moreover, because decision rules often differ in what information they require, different sets of decision rules may activate different retrieval processes or search engines and may access different memory systems or sets of memory systems. Without engines that can search for and retrieve the right information, supplying it to the right decision rule at the right time, an organ designed to store ontogenetically acquired information-that is, a memory system-would be a pointless appendage. Hence, adaptive behavior over tim...

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“…Autobiographical memory has a directive or selfregulatory function as it involves using the past to guide present and future thought and behaviour (e.g., Barclay, 1996;Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000;Lerner & Gonzalez, 2005;Neisser, 1988;Skowronski, Walker, & Betz, 2004). In this spirit, regret can have a preparative function ("lessons to be learned").…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Studies on self-memories have shown that self-judgments (e.g., life satisfaction) are assimilated to recalled experiences or events if these memories still bear on the current self. People are likely to experience an increased sense of well-being if a favourable past subjectively feels near (e.g., Barclay, 1996;McMullen, 1997;Strack, Schwarz, & Gscheidinger, 1985). If remembering heats the present self, it seems implausible that people imagine alternatives to what they factually have recalled.…”

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confidence: 99%

I am so glad that we parted! Am I? On attitude representation, counterfactual thinking, and experienced regret

Grabowski¹,

Broemer²

2015

Polish Psychological Bulletin

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Two studies examined how different linguistic forms affect the way in which people access memories of former close relationships that are irrevocably over. Remembering former relationships can activate either positive or negative attitudes. Whether people feel sorrow that bygones are in fact bygones depends on attitudinal valence, but also on the linguistic form in which people express their attitudes. More abstract linguistic forms prevent people from retrieving specific and detailed memories, and thus prompt them to generating more counterfactual thoughts and to experience stronger regret. In contrast, more concrete linguistic forms lead people to remember their personal past more vividly and accurately, and this subjective impression can forestall counterfactual thinking. Study 2 further shows that people are more prone to generate counterfactual thoughts when they focus on the final stage of their relationships rather than the beginning even when the valence of recalled attitudes and objective time are controlled.

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Autobiographical remembering: Narrative constraints on objectified selves

Cited by 92 publications

References 0 publications

Memory and coping with stress: The relationship between cognitive–emotional distinctiveness, memory valence, and distress

Memory and coping with stress: The relationship between cognitive–emotional distinctiveness, memory valence, and distress

Decisions and the evolution of memory: Multiple systems, multiple functions.

I am so glad that we parted! Am I? On attitude representation, counterfactual thinking, and experienced regret

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