Autocracy, Democracy, and FDI Inflows to the Developing Countries

Yang, Benhua

doi:10.1080/10168730601027179

Cited by 35 publications

(21 citation statements)

References 28 publications

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“…Yang categorizes these channels into four major categories (Yang 2007). First, technology holders can export the goods directly.…”

Section: Technology Transfer Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Meanwhile, skills, such as complex engineering processes, tend to be embedded in organizational routines and, therefore, are difficult to extract from another firm (Inkpen and Beamish 1997). The tacit aspect of skills can only be transferred through personal interaction and cooperation, which may be achieved more readily by joint ventures rather than licensing, FDI or goods trade (Yang 2007).…”

Section: Joint Ventures As a Tool For Technology Transfermentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Meanwhile, harvesting refers to the flow of transformed and newly created knowledge from joint ventures back to the partners' parent firms. In this way, joint ventures provide the possibility of transformation and harvesting, which facilitates more effective and profound technology transfer (Yang 2007).…”

Section: Joint Ventures As a Tool For Technology Transfermentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Technology Transfer Through Joint Ventures in the Aviation MRO Industry: The Case of Turkish Technic

Oktay¹,

Özer²

2011

Designing Public Procurement Policy in Developing Countries

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“…Yang categorizes these channels into four major categories (Yang 2007). First, technology holders can export the goods directly.…”

Section: Technology Transfer Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Joint Ventures As a Tool For Technology Transfermentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Technology Transfer Through Joint Ventures in the Aviation MRO Industry: The Case of Turkish Technic

Oktay¹,

Özer²

2011

Designing Public Procurement Policy in Developing Countries

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“…Some authors choose to model FDI in levels without rescaling, as in Egger and Winner (2005), Jensen (2003) and Li and Resnick (2003). Others specify the dependent variable as the natural log of FDI (or closely related transformations), as in Busse (2004), Globerman and Shapiro (2002), Habib and Zurawicki (2002), Mathur and Singh (2013) and Yang (2007), as well as the analysis of bilateral flows using gravity models in Bénassy-Quéré et al (2007), Daude and Stein (2007) and Wei (2000). When estimating the determinants of unscaled aggregate FDI inflows using cross-country data, it is, of course, essential to control for country size by including a measure of aggregate economic activity or population (or both) among the explanatory variables.…”

Section: Normalization Of the Dependent Variablementioning

confidence: 99%

Expropriation risk and FDI in developing countries: Does return of capital dominate return on capital?

Akhtaruzzaman

Berg

Hajzler

2017

European Journal of Political Economy

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. ii Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractPreviously reported effects of institutional quality and political risks on foreign direct investment (FDI) are mixed and, therefore, difficult to interpret. We present empirical evidence suggesting a relatively clear, statistically robust, and intuitive characterization. Institutional factors that affect the likelihood of an abrupt and total loss of foreigners' capital (i.e., return of capital) dominate those that affect rates of return conditional on a strictly positive terminal investment value (i.e., return on capital). A one-standarddeviation reduction in expropriation risk is associated with a 72 per cent increase in FDI, which is substantially larger than the effects of any other dimensions of institutional quality simultaneously controlled for in our empirical models of FDI inflows. This evidence is consistent with the predictions of a standard theory of FDI under imperfect contract enforcement. We show in the context of a simple model with endogenous expropriation that, when there is a binding threat of expropriation, foreign investors can become unresponsive to differences in other dimensions of institutions and political risk, and may even reduce optimal investment as these institutions improve. Bank topics: Development economics, International financial markets JEL codes: D23, F21, F23 RésuméLes effets signalés antérieurement qu'exercent la qualité des institutions et les risques politiques sur l'investissement direct étranger (IDE) sont contrastés et, par conséquent, difficiles à interpréter. Nous présentons des données empiriques qui font ressortir une caractérisation intuitive statistiquement solide. Les facteurs institutionnels ayant une incidence sur la probabilité d'une perte soudaine et totale du capital détenu par des étrangers (remboursement de capital) l'emportent sur ceux touchant les taux de rendement subordonnés à une valeur nue finale strictement positive (rendement du capital investi). Une réduction de un écart-type du risque d'expropriation est associée à une augmentation de 72 % de l'IDE, une hausse nettement supérieure à celles engendrées par n'importe quels autres aspects de la qualité des institutions pris en compte simultanément dans nos modèles empiriques d'entrées d'IDE. Ce résultat cadre avec les prédictions d'une théorie classique de l'IDE où l'exécution des contrats est imparfaite. Dans un modèle simple intégrant un facteur d'expropriation endogène, nous démontrons qu...

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“…For example, Li (2009) argued that democratic regime is not a remedy for eliminating the risk of expropriation. According to Yang (2007) there is no systematic relationship between democracy and FDI inflows. Being a democracy does not help to attract higher levels of FDI.…”

Section: Heterogeneous International Institutions Domestic Politics mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Political Economy of FDI Flows into Developing Countries: Does the Depth of International Trade Agreements Matter?

Rana

Kebewar

2014

SSRN Journal

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There is considerable debate whether the domestic political institutions (specifically, the country's level of democracy) of the host developing country toward foreign investors are effective in establishing the credibility of commitments are still underway, researchers have also analyzed the effect of international institutions such as (GATT-WTO) membership and Bilateral Investment treaties (BIT) in their role of establishing the credibility of commitment to attract foreign investments. In addition, most recent studies have examined the effect of International Trade Agreements (TAs) on FDI flows as they contain separate investment chapters and dispute settlement mechanism, thus providing confidence to investor regarding the security of their investments. We argue that there are qualitative differences among various types of trade agreements and full-fledged trade agreements (FTA-CU) provide credibility to foreign investors and democracy level in the host country conditions this effect whereas the partial scope agreements (PSA) are not sufficient in providing credibility of commitments and not moderated by democracy. This paper analyses the impact of heterogeneous TAs, and their interaction with domestic institutions, on FDI inflows. Statistical analyses for 122 developing countries from 1970 to 2005 support this argument. The method adopted relies on fixed effects estimator which is robust to control endogeneity on a large panel dataset. The strict erogeneity of results by using a method suggested by Baier and Bergstrand (2007) and no feedback effect found in sample. The results state that (1) More the FTA-CU concluded, larger the amount of FDI inflows are attracted into the developing countries and PSA are insignificant in determining the FDI inflow; (2) FTA-CU are complementary to democratic regime whereas the conditional effect of PSA with democracy on levels of FDI inflows is insignificant.

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Autocracy, Democracy, and FDI Inflows to the Developing Countries

Cited by 35 publications

References 28 publications

Technology Transfer Through Joint Ventures in the Aviation MRO Industry: The Case of Turkish Technic

Technology Transfer Through Joint Ventures in the Aviation MRO Industry: The Case of Turkish Technic

Expropriation risk and FDI in developing countries: Does return of capital dominate return on capital?

The Political Economy of FDI Flows into Developing Countries: Does the Depth of International Trade Agreements Matter?

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