Autocratic Consent to International Law: The Case of the International Criminal Court's Jurisdiction, 1998–2017

Abstract

This article contributes to an understanding of why autocrats have accepted the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. Leveraging their ability to obstruct their own prosecution, autocrats have traded off the risk of unwanted prosecutions against the deterrent threat that prosecutions pose to political rivals and patrons of their enemies conspiring to oust them. The risk of unwanted prosecutions and the court's deterrent threat both arise because ICC prosecutions credibly communicate guilt for international crimes to capital-disbursing democracies, which may, insofar as possible, use leader-specific economic statecraft to prevent the administration of foreign states by those whom the court signals are guilty of international crimes. Analysis using fixed effects and matching shows that a greater reliance on capital publicly financed by democracies increased the probability that a state accepted the court's jurisdiction only when it was an autocracy (1998–2017). ICC jurisdiction also lengthened the tenure of autocrats and reduced the severity of civil conflict in autocracies.

Without an army: How ICC indictments reduce atrocities

“…These third-wave studies point to a variety of mediating factors to explain 'the how' of the ICC's influence. The studies suggest that the court's effectiveness at addressing violence increases with a higher probability of domestic punishment against perpetrators (Prorok, 2017), threats of prosecution from the ICC (Mendeloff, 2018), perpetrators' dependence on financial capital from democracies (Hashimoto, 2020), and the ICC's ability to shape the narrative surrounding the conflict (Kersten, 2016). This scholarship is consistent with related work on international tribunals that shows the tribunals to be more effective at deterring atrocities if they meet certain conditions such as strong support for prosecutors (McAllister, 2020).…”

“…Some indictees are more exposed to external pressure brought on by the indictments than others. For instance, as Hashimoto (2020) points out, countries with leaders that rely on foreign capital from democracies are more likely to have ratified the Rome Statute. Groups affiliated with these leaders, consequently, are more vulnerable to facing heavy costs from indictments as democracies can cut off their capital flows.…”