Automated analysis of security-design models

Abstract

We have previously proposed SecureUML, an expressive UML-based language for constructing security-design models, which are models that combine design specifications for distributed systems with specifications of their security policies. Here we show how to automate the analysis of such models in a semantically precise and meaningful way. In our approach, models are formalized together with scenarios that represent possible run-time instances. Queries about properties of the security policy modeled are expressed as formulas in UML's Object Constraint Language. The policy may include both declarative aspects, i.e., static accesscontrol information such as the assignment of users and permissions to roles, and programmatic aspects, which depend on dynamic information, namely the satisfaction of authorization constraints in a given scenario. We show how such properties can be evaluated, completely automatically, in the context of the metamodel of the security-design language. We demonstrate, through examples, that this approach can be used to formalize and check non-trivial security properties. The approach has been implemented in the SecureMOVA tool and all of the examples presented have been checked using this tool.

Secure and Compliant Implementation of Business Process-Driven Systems

“…SecureUML is a meta-model-based extension of UML that allows for specifying RBAC-requirements for UML class models and state charts. There are also various techniques for analyzing SecureUML models, e. g., [7,11]. While based on the same motivation, UMLsec [16] is not defined using a meta-model.…”

Comprehensive two-level analysis of role-based delegation and revocation policies with UML and OCL

“…Several works on the validation of RBAC policies based on UML and OCL have been presented [42,30,28,43]. Based upon SecureUML, Basin et al propose an approach to analyzing RBAC policies by stating and evaluating queries like 'Which permissions can a user perform with a given role?'…”

“…or 'Are there two roles with the same set of permissions?' [42]. Although not explicitly addressed in this paper, our approach allows the same kind of queries through the query facility of the USE tool [15] into which the model validator is integrated.…”

Idea: Towards Architecture-Centric Security Analysis of Software

“…Two such specification languages are UMLsec [13], which allows one to formulate security requirements w.r.t. access control and confidentiality, and SecureUML [2], which allows one to model RBAC policies. In addition, Basin et al present an approach to analyzing RBAC policies based on UML meta-modelling [2].…”

“…access control and confidentiality, and SecureUML [2], which allows one to model RBAC policies. In addition, Basin et al present an approach to analyzing RBAC policies based on UML meta-modelling [2]. Our work currently is focused on checking the intended architecture against the implemented low-level architecture, although analyzing the architecture itself remains future work.…”