The parity effect in arithmetic problem verification tasks refers to faster and more accurate judgments for false equations when the odd/even status of the proposed answer mismatches that of the correct answer. In two experiments, we examined whether the proportion of incorrect answers that violated parity or the number of even operands in the problem affected the magnitude of these effects. Experiment 1 showed larger parity effects for problems with two even operands and larger parity effects during the second half of the experiment. Experiment 2 replicated the results of Experiment 1 and varied the proportion of problems violating parity. Larger parity effects were obtained when more of the false problems violated parity. Moreover, all three effects combined to show the greatest parity effects in conditions with a high proportion of parity violations in problems containing two even operands that were solved during the second half of the experiment. Experiment 3 generalized the findings to the case of five rule (i.e., checking whether a false product ends in 5 or 0), another procedure for solving and verifying multiplication problems quickly. These results (1) delineate further constraints for inclusion in models of arithmetic processing when thinking about how people select among verification strategies, (2) show combined effects of variables that traditionally have been shown to have separate effects on people's strategy selection, and (3) are consistent with a view of strategy selection that suggests a bias either in the allocation of cognitive resources in the execution of strategies or in the order of execution of these strategies; they argue against a simple, unbiased competition among strategies.A very striking feature of human cognition is that people use multiple strategies to accomplish most cognitive tasks. In domains as diverse as arithmetic, serial recall, question answering, sentence verification, reading, and naive physics, people know and use multiple strategies (see, e.g., Ashcraft, 1992;Collins, 1978;Donley & Ashcraft, 1992;Glucksberg & McCloskey, 1981; Hasher & Zacks, 1979;Jacoby & Dallas, 1981;Lemaire, Abdi, & Fayol, 1996;Lemaire, Fayol, & Abdi, 1991;Lemaire & Siegler, 1995;Mandler, 1980, Norman, 1973Reder, 1982Reder, , 1987Reder & Anderson, 1980;Reder & Ritter, 1992;Siegler & Shrager, 1984;Smith, Shoben, & Rips, 1974; Stone & This research was supported in part by the French National Science Foundation Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), and by the U.S. Office ofNaval Research, Contract No. NOOO 14-95-1-0223, by NIMH Grant IROI MH52808-01, and by AFOSR Grant F49620-97-0054. We thank Jason Wyse for collecting the data for Experiments I and 2 and Alison Clark for assistance in many phases of manuscript preparation. We also thank Mark Ashcraft, Jamie Campbell, Jason Carr, James Dixon, David Geary, and Jane Zbrodofffor especially useful comments on previous drafts. Correspondence concerning this article should be sent to P. Lemaire, University of Provence, Departement de Psyc...