Automatic and controlled components of judgment and decision making.

Ferreira, Mário B.; Garcia­‐Marques, Leonel; Sherman, Steven J.; Sherman, Jeffrey W.

doi:10.1037/0022-3514.91.5.797

Cited by 180 publications

(203 citation statements)

References 94 publications

(191 reference statements)

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“…By applying the process dissociation procedure (Ferreira et al, 2006;Jacoby, 1991), we were able to show that the improvement in performance of the logical-people group was associated with an increase in analytical processing while leaving heuristic processing largely unchanged. In other words, an equally appealing heuristic response was more often overcome and replaced by an analytical response when responders were encouraged to behave logically.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 89%

“…In the aforementioned examples, syllogisms can be created where the believability of the conclusions may correspond to the logical valid response; in BR problems, the individual description may be consistent with the base rates. By contrasting reasoning performance in the exclusion and inclusion conditions, Ferreira et al (2006) were able to obtain estimates of both analytic and heuristic processes and gain further insight into the nature of the interaction between them (see also Mata, Ferreira, & Reis, 2013;Mata, Fiedler, Ferreira, & Almeida, 2013). In the present research, we extend the use of the PD procedure by applying it to the ratio-bias task (Bonner & Newell, 2010) and obtain estimates of both analytic (controlled) processes (C) and heuristic processes (H).…”

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confidence: 99%

“…The more general point is that no task is "process pure" (Conrey, Sherman, Gawronsky, Hugenberg, & Groom, 2005;Ferreira, Garcia-Marques, Sherman, & Sherman, 2006;Jacoby, 1991). It is highly unlikely that so-called heuristic responses to an inferential task depend entirely on heuristic processes and not at all on analytical processes, or vice versa.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Analytic and heuristic processes in the detection and resolution of conflict

Ferreira

Mata²,

Donkin

et al. 2016

Mem Cogn

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Previous research with the ratio-bias task found larger response latencies for conflict trials where the heuristic-and analytic-based responses are assumed to be in opposition (e.g., choosing between 1/10 and 9/100 ratios of success) when compared to no-conflict trials where both processes converge on the same response (e.g., choosing between 1/10 and 11/100). This pattern is consistent with parallel dualprocess models, which assume that there is effective, rather than lax, monitoring of the output of heuristic processing. It is, however, unclear why conflict resolution sometimes fails. Ratio-biased choices may increase because of a decline in analytical reasoning (leaving heuristic-based responses unopposed) or to a rise in heuristic processing (making it more difficult for analytic processes to override the heuristic preferences). Using the process-dissociation procedure, we found that instructions to respond logically and response speed affected analytic (controlled) processing (C), leaving heuristic processing (H) unchanged, whereas the intuitive preference for large nominators (as assessed by responses to equal ratio trials) affected H but not C. These findings create new challenges to the debate between dual-process and singleprocess accounts, which are discussed.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 89%

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confidence: 99%

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Analytic and heuristic processes in the detection and resolution of conflict

Ferreira

Mata²,

Donkin

et al. 2016

Mem Cogn

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Section: Towards a Valid Normative Model Of Transitive Inferencementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Most notably, Evans (2003) discusses a Dual Process account of reasoning. This theory argues for the existence of an evolutionary-older network of brain structures for "associative" reasoning, plus a more specialist newer network for "deductive" reasoning (see also De Neys & Glumicic, in press; Ferreira, Garcia-Marques, Sherman & Sherman, 2006;Kokis et al, 2002;Reyna, 2004).In contrast to dual process accounts of reasoning and of transitive inference in particular, some researchers continue to hold that transitive tasks may differ but transitive inference is one and only one cognitive ability (Bryant, 1998;Halford & Andrews, 2004;Wynne, 1998). Regardless of which conclusion one currently prefers, it remains the case that limiting research largely to the B&T task might restrict or even cause the types of theory that might be developed about other aspects of transitive inference (Wright, 1998a).…”

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confidence: 99%

Getting one step closer to deduction: Introducing an alternative paradigm for transitive inference

Wright¹,

Howells²

2008

Thinking & Reasoning

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Transitive inference is claimed to be "deductive". Yet every group/species ever reported apparently uses it. We asked 58 adults to solve 5-term transitive tasks, requiring neither training nor premise learning. A computer-based procedure ensured all premises were continually visible.response-accuracy and RT (non-discriminative nRT) were measured as typically done. We also measured RT confined to correct responses (cRT). Overall, very few typical transitive phenomena emerged. The symbolic distance effect never extended to premise recall and was not at all evident for nRT; suggesting the use of non-deductive end-anchor strategies. For overall performance and particularly the critical B?D inference, our findings indicate deductive transitive inference is far more intellectually challenging than previously thought. Contrasts of our present findings against previous findings, suggests at least two distinct transitive inference modes, with most research and most computational models to date targeting an associative mode rather than their desired deductive mode. This conclusion fits well with the growing number of theories embracing a "Dual Process" conception of reasoning. Finally, our differing findings for nRT versus cRT, suggests researchers should give closer consideration to matching the RT measure they use to the particular conception of transitive inference they pre-held. Inference (Goel, Makale & Grafman, 2004;Goodwin & Johnson-Laird, 2005;Martin & Alsop, 2004). Consider the following example. During your lunch break yesterday, you might have gone out running with one friend (say Jane), and noted that you really struggled to keep up with her.We can term the above information a premise, where A and B are entities and there is some comparison made between them (i.e. premise A:B). Now, during today's lunch break you ran the same route with Kerry, and noted she was really struggling to keep up with you (premise B:C). At the end of the day, Kerry tells you Jane has asked her to go running during tomorrow's lunch break, asking you whether you think she will struggle or not (A?C). A transitive inference allows you to work out that, exceptional circumstances aside, Kerry will struggle running with Jane. The beauty is that you can infer such an outcome, without having already experienced it directly.Many argue that the capacity for transitive inference is logical (i.e., deductive), partly because the conclusion necessarily follows as long as the relation used is a linear comparative term (e.g., "runs faster than"), and partly because we can deduce the conclusion upon simply being told the two premises, rather than having to directly perceive and verify them as true for ourselves.Transitive inference may lay at the heart of a plethora of cognitive and sub-cognitive competencies, from spatial navigation through to predicting where to find food; and from placing oneself within a social network through to scientific thinking (Allen, 2006;Archie et al., 2006;Bond, Kamil & Bolda, 2003;Hummel & Holyoak, 2001;Markovits...

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