Autonomy and international organisations

Abstract

For two decades scholars have used insights from constructivist approaches and principal-agent (P-A) theory to understand the relationship between states and international organisations (IOs). Together, these works identify the conditions under which IOs can operate independently of states, although they have yet to explain when and why IO bureaucrats are likely to do so. Nor do they articulate a clear and consistent definition of autonomy. In this article, we seek to fill these gaps. We advance a narrow understanding of autonomy that distinguishes unintended behaviour from the intended independence of IO bureaucrats, before developing a three-stage, integrative explanation for the conditions under which IO bureaucrats act autonomously. First, we borrow from constructivist approaches a focus on staffing rules and the identity of IO bureaucrats to explain the sources of these agents’ preferences. Second, we add insights from work on exogenous pressures for change—crises and critical junctures—to explain when and why IO bureaucrats will advance their preferences. Third, we incorporate P-A theory’s attention to an IO’s institutional design, along with insights from literature on domestic institutions, to explain when bureaucrats can implement their preferences. Case studies of the World Health Organization (WHO) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) illustrate our argument.

Under what conditions does bureaucracy matter in the making of global public policies?

“…Second, the relationship between bureaucratic autonomy and policy influence remains unclear despite the core role political science grants to it. Studies do stress structural bureaucratic autonomy as an important intra‐organizational factor (Cortell & Peterson, 2022; Haftel & Thompson, 2006; Manulak, 2016; Urpelainen, 2012). Yet, empirically grounding the impact of structural bureaucratic autonomy in actual instances of IO policymaking proved difficult.…”

“…“Even if an actor has autonomy […], it may still have very little influence” (Haftel & Thompson, 2006, p. 256). Yet, despite recent research on formal and informal administrative patterns (see e.g., Bauer et al., 2017; Knill et al., 2019; Trondal et al., 2012), systematic empirical analyses linking bureaucratic autonomy to IO policymaking and IPA influence are scarce (Cortell & Peterson, 2022; Ege et al., 2019; but see Barnett & Finnemore, 2004; Manulak, 2016; Urpelainen, 2012).…”

“…The secretariat's autonomy from member states is an important resource that—under specific conditions—can be used to influence policy (Weinlich, 2014, p. 62). This autonomy provides the administration with room for maneuver beyond its formally delegated discretion (Carpenter, 2001; Cortell & Peterson, 2022, p. 403). Autonomy of will is expected to allow the IPA to become influential early in the process.…”

Earmarked Funding and the Control–Performance Trade-Off in International Development Organizations

“…23.Cortell and Peterson 2021; Hawkins et al 2006; Nielson and Tierney 2003; Nielson, Tierney, and Weaver 2006.…”