Autonomy, free speech and automatic behaviour

Abstract

One of the strongest defences of free speech holds that autonomy requires the protection of speech. In this paper I examine five conditions that autonomy must satisfy. I survey recent research in social psychology regarding automatic behaviour, and a challenge to autonomy is articulated. I argue that a plausible strategy for neutralising some of the autonomy-threatening automatic responses consists in avoiding the exposure to the environmental features that trigger them. If this is so, we can good autonomy-based pro tanto reasons for controlling exposure to certain forms of speech.

Affective polarization in the digital age: Testing the direction of the relationship between social media and users’ feelings for out-group parties

“…Thus, more balanced and nuanced entries may get lost in the feeds in favor of passionate entries by users who make use of social media as a way to satisfy an expressive interest. For people who have passionate opinions or feelings, trying to convince others of the validity of their views may become a matter of personal and moral integrity (Moles, 2007). Individuals who come to more strongly oppose out-group parties and their supporters may be more drawn to social media as a venue that allows them to realize an expressive need.…”

Bad Beliefs

“…The view I defend in the next three chapters has a passing resem blance to a more familiar position, one I used to endorse myself. This position is also sometimes offered in response to worries about ep i ste mic paternalism, and holds that Enlightenment ideals of intellectual autonomy are psychologically unrealistic; instead paternalistic measures must take up the slack (Conly 2013;Levy 2012;Moles 2007). This famil iar response appeals to the rationality deficit view of ourselves we out lined in Chapter 1, according to which contemporary psychology has shown that rationality is a scarce resource and that for the most part we respond relatively unthinkingly.…”

Freedom of expression

“…111‐2; Chambers, 2021; cf. Moles, 2007); by their lack of the epistemic virtue of ‘accuracy’, which involves ‘making a goodwill effort to find out what is true or to acquire true belief’ (Chambers, 2021, p. 159); and by a social media infrastructure that facilitates fake news's rapid diffusion, with uncertain norms over whether sharing messages implies endorsing them (Rini, 2017). Similarly, by exploiting cognitive biases, fake news seems to disrespect individual autonomy.…”