Averaging bias in environmental impact estimates: Evidence from the negative footprint illusion

Holmgren, Mattias; Andersson, Hanna; Sörqvist, Patrik

doi:10.1016/j.jenvp.2017.12.005

Cited by 37 publications

(61 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…Because of this, we conclude that people can be susceptible to the negative footprint illusion even when they have sufficient mathematical skills and knowledge of the items’ environmental impact. Moreover, the present study also suggests that the illusion can survive when people are able to compare the two to-be-evaluated sets and generalizes to judgment dimensions other than carbon footprint estimates (Gorissen and Weijters, 2016; Holmgren et al, 2018). …”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 61%

“…A possible explanation of the negative footprint illusion, based on previous research (Holmgren et al, 2018), is that the effect is underpinned by an averaging process. Rather than basing their estimates of the environmental impact of a category of items on the sum of A and B (which would be more accurate), people appear to base their estimates on the average of A and B.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Experimental evidence suggests that an averaging process underpins this “negative footprint illusion,” by which people base their estimates on the average rather than the sum of the items in the set. We argue that this averaging process is responsible for people’s tendency to think that the addition of environmentally friendly objects compensates for the negative impact of less friendly objects (Holmgren et al, 2018). Further, we assume that the averaging bias has its roots in a balancing heuristic shaped by natural selection to handled social exchange between people (Sörqvist and Langeborg, unpublished).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Psychological science may not be able to stop climate change on its own (Gifford, 2011) but it can help identify why and how people’s ability to make accurate environmental impact estimates of their actions is biased (Sörqvist, 2016). Drawing from previous research (Holmgren et al, 2018), this paper investigates whether the estimated environmental impact of a set of items is reduced when “green” objects are added to the set—a negative footprint illusion. Specifically, the current study explores whether people are immune to this illusion when they have the necessary knowledge to make accurate estimates.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A similar phenomenon has also been found in people’s tendency to think about the costs and benefits of objects. Holmgren et al (2018) showed that people’s estimates of the environmental impact of a set of conventional buildings are higher, compared to a set containing the same number of conventional buildings in addition to a number of “green” (energy efficient) buildings, as if the benefits of the “green” buildings compensate for some of the costs of the conventional buildings. Experimental evidence suggests that an averaging process underpins this “negative footprint illusion,” by which people base their estimates on the average rather than the sum of the items in the set.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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When A+B < A: Cognitive Bias in Experts’ Judgment of Environmental Impact

et al. 2018

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When ‘environmentally friendly’ items are added to a set of conventional items, people report that the total set will have a lower environmental impact even though the actual impact increases. One hypothesis is that this “negative footprint illusion” arises because people, who are susceptible to the illusion, lack necessary knowledge of the item’s actual environmental impact, perhaps coupled with a lack of mathematical skills. The study reported here addressed this hypothesis by recruiting participants (‘experts’) from a master’s program in energy systems, who thus have bachelor degrees in energy-related fields including academic training in mathematics. They were asked to estimate the number of trees needed to compensate for the environmental burden of two sets of buildings: one set of 150 buildings with conventional energy ratings and one set including the same 150 buildings but also 50 ‘green’ (energy-efficient) buildings. The experts reported that less trees were needed to compensate for the set with 150 conventional and 50 ‘green’ buildings compared to the set with only the 150 conventional buildings. This negative footprint illusion was as large in magnitude for the experts as it was for a group of novices without academic training in energy-related fields. We conclude that people are not immune to the negative footprint illusion even when they have the knowledge necessary to make accurate judgments.

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 61%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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When A+B < A: Cognitive Bias in Experts’ Judgment of Environmental Impact

et al. 2018

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All's eco‐friendly that ends eco‐friendly: Short‐term memory effects in carbon footprint estimates of temporal item sequences

Sörqvist,

Lindeberg,

Marsh

2024

Applied Cognitive Psychology

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When people estimate the summative carbon footprint of a sequence of events, how are the individual events integrated? In three experiments, we found that summative carbon footprint judgments of item sequences are disproportionately influenced by items at the end of the sequence in comparison with those at the beginning—a recency effect. When, for example, sequences ended with a low carbon footprint item, they were assigned a lower carbon footprint than corresponding sequences with an identical content but different item order. The results also revealed that a green peak (presenting many low carbon footprint items at once) had a relatively large effect on estimates when the peak was contextually distinct from other items in terms of its valence. The results are consistent with an account within which distinctiveness of representations within short‐term memory differentially influences decision‐making and suggest that memory processes bias the perceived environmental footprint of temporally separated instances.

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Thinking structures of climate delay: internal deliberations among Swedes with sustainable ambitions

Wormbs,

Wolrath Söderberg

2023

Environ Dev Sustain

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It is important to understand how individuals in affluent societies reason around their own actions in relation to climate change. However, much of the research has focused on sceptics and those who have little interest in change. Studying those who want to contribute to a transition and why they fail is also of interest. This study is qualitative and deals with the internal reasoning of a self-selected sample of Swedes with sustainable values who argue in relation to a failed intention. Ca 400 responses were analysed. We used topos theory to identify thinking structures that guide the arguments used to deal with the cognitive dissonance that acting against knowledge and intention results in. The most common ways to argue were to imagine a climate account with possible deposits and withdrawals, or a budget which you strive to keep. Also common was to compare with something or someone that was ”worse”. Redirecting responsibility was also an argument, albeit complicating the issue of responsibility. The limits of reality were used as an excuse for action, whereas articulating the goal conflicts of a less emitting life made choices visible. Finally, the human condition of not always meeting your own standards was mentioned. These arguments only partly overlap common discourses of delay in the public sphere.

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Averaging bias in environmental impact estimates: Evidence from the negative footprint illusion

Cited by 37 publications

References 21 publications

When A+B < A: Cognitive Bias in Experts’ Judgment of Environmental Impact

When A+B < A: Cognitive Bias in Experts’ Judgment of Environmental Impact

All's eco‐friendly that ends eco‐friendly: Short‐term memory effects in carbon footprint estimates of temporal item sequences

Thinking structures of climate delay: internal deliberations among Swedes with sustainable ambitions

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