2015
DOI: 10.1080/07036337.2015.1034276
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Avoiding Paralysis: The Eastern Enlargement and the Council of the European Union

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Cited by 7 publications
(8 citation statements)
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References 34 publications
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“…Quite simply, ministers do not find the time to engage with EU politics as much as they used to. This seems to be in line with previous results showing a growing prominence of COREPER and Council working groups compared to the ministerial sessions (Parizek, Hosli, and Plechanovova 2015).…”
Section: Discussionsupporting
confidence: 93%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Quite simply, ministers do not find the time to engage with EU politics as much as they used to. This seems to be in line with previous results showing a growing prominence of COREPER and Council working groups compared to the ministerial sessions (Parizek, Hosli, and Plechanovova 2015).…”
Section: Discussionsupporting
confidence: 93%
“…An important imperative for a state or government is to make sure it is not out-ranked in such exchanges. In addition, a systematic replacement of political leaders in the Council by bureaucrats may have important functional and normative consequences, where formal decision-making responsibility resides with political leaders, but de facto control is increasingly in the hands of unelected officials (Häge 2008(Häge , 2013Parizek, Hosli, and Plechanovova 2015).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Some argue that eastern enlargement has led to a new East-West cleavage in the Council (Mattila, 2009) and that different factors, such as vote weight, budget benefits from the EU, or government positions (left-right, EU integration), are driving voting behavior in old and new member states (Hosli, Mattila, & Uriot, 2011). Other authors note that the paralysis in EU decision-making that was awaited as a result of eastern enlargement did not materialize (Hagemann & de Clerck-Sachsse, 2007;Parízek, Hosli, & Plechanovová, 2015;Toshkov, 2017). While the success of pre-accession conditionality or post-accession socialization might partially explain this, the new member states' policy prefer-ences were unclear or matched already existing conflict lines within the Council.…”
Section: Post-accession Decision-making In Eu Energy and Climate Policymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…While the success of pre-accession conditionality or post-accession socialization might partially explain this, the new member states' policy prefer-ences were unclear or matched already existing conflict lines within the Council. Adding to this, institutional solutions, such as delegation to lower echelons of decisionmaking, have helped to avoid gridlock (König & Junge, 2009;Parízek et al, 2015).…”
Section: Post-accession Decision-making In Eu Energy and Climate Policymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Second, there is a "folk theorem" on the effect of the number of negotiating governments. There is an ongoing debate whether enlargement has led to slowed down decision-making or to gridlock in secondary legislation (Golub, 2007;Hertz & Leuffen, 2011;Junge, König, & Luig, 2014;König, 2008;Parízek, Hosli, & Plechanovová, 2015). The basic conjecture is that more members lead to increased heterogeneity of political goals, preferences and beliefs (cf.…”
Section: Hypothesesmentioning
confidence: 99%