Awareness of action: Inference and prediction

Abstract

This study investigates whether the conscious awareness of action is based on predictive motor control processes, or on inferential "sense-making" process that occur after the action itself. We investigated whether the temporal binding between perceptual estimates of operant actions and their effects depends on the occurrence of the effect (inferential processes) or on the prediction that the effect will occur (predictive processes). By varying the probability with which a simple manual action produced an auditory effect, we showed that both the actual and the predicted occurrence of the effect played a role.When predictability of the effect of action was low, temporal binding was found only on those trials where the auditory effect occurred. In contrast, when predictability of the effect of action was high, temporal binding occurred even on trials where the action produced no effect. Further analysis showed that the predictive process is modulated by recent experience of the action-effect relation. We conclude that the experience of action depends on a dynamic combination of predictive and inferential processes.

Feelings of control: Contingency determines experience of action

“…To isolate purely postdictive inferential components of action experience, we focus on 'action + tone' trials in the low tone probability group, because the low tone probability reduces the risk of confounds due to prediction (Moore & Haggard 2008). If background contextual knowledge affects this postdictive inferential component of action experience, this shift should be greater in this low tone probability group where ∆p is high, since high ∆p values provide strong evidence of a causal link between action and tone.…”

“…This 'intentional binding' involves a predictive element, because omitting the effect does not prevent the shift in perceived time of action, as long as the probability of an effect given an action is sufficiently high (Moore & Haggard, 2008). It also involves an inferential "postdictive" element, because the tone's occurrence shifts the perceived time of action, even when tone probability is low (Moore & Haggard, 2008).…”

“…This 'intentional binding' involves a predictive element, because omitting the effect does not prevent the shift in perceived time of action, as long as the probability of an effect given an action is sufficiently high (Moore & Haggard, 2008). It also involves an inferential "postdictive" element, because the tone's occurrence shifts the perceived time of action, even when tone probability is low (Moore & Haggard, 2008).This suggests that the human mind builds internal models of action-effect relations, which determine the experience of action. Here, we investigate whether rules thought to govern causal learning in animals might also underlie the experience of agency in humans.…”

“…By analysing these separately we estimated the predictive and the postdictive inferential components of the conscious experience of action. If an action is not followed by a tone, but the probability of tone given action is high, the experience of action may be influenced by the prediction that the tone might occur (Moore & Haggard, 2008). Conversely, if any particular action is followed by a tone, action experience may be retrospectively altered by occurrence of the tone.…”

A Computational Analysis of Joint Decision Making Processes

“…155-158; see also [10], pp. 79-80; [11,12]): sensory representation  preparation for bodily changes = emotional response  emotion felt = based on sensory representation of (simulated) bodily changes An as-if body loop describes an internal simulation of the bodily processes, without actually affecting the body, comparable to simulation in order to perform, for example, prediction, mindreading or imagination; e.g., [2], [16], [17], [20], [28]. The feelings generated in this way play an important role in valuing predicted or imagined effects of actions, in relation to amygdala activations; see, e.g., [29], [31].…”