Axiomatization of the Shapley value using the balanced cycle contributions property

Kamijo, Yoshio; Kongo, Takumi

doi:10.1007/s00182-009-0187-0

Cited by 27 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…By (6), ϕ Q is Efficient. Using equality (8) and the fact that Q is Null for one-player null games, we conclude that ϕ Q satisfies Invariance from player deletion in presence of a Q-related player. It remains to verify whether ϕ Q satisfies Balanced cycle contributions.…”

Section: Balanced Cycle Contributionsmentioning

confidence: 88%

Preserving or removing special players: What keeps your payoff unchanged in TU-games?

Béal

Rémila²,

Solal³

2015

Mathematical Social Sciences

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CNRS : 2; AERES: AInternational audienceIf a player is removed from a game, what keeps the payoff of the remaining players unchanged? Is it the removal of a special player or its presence among the remaining players? This article answers this question in a complement study to Kamijo and Kongo (2012). We introduce axioms of invariance from player deletion in presence of a special player. In particular, if the special player is a nullifying player (resp. dummifying player), then the equal division value (resp. equal surplus division value) is characterized by the associated axiom of invariance plus efficiency and balanced cycle contributions. There is no type of special player from such a combination of axioms that characterizes the Shapley value

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Section: Balanced Cycle Contributionsmentioning

confidence: 88%

Preserving or removing special players: What keeps your payoff unchanged in TU-games?

Béal

Rémila²,

Solal³

2015

Mathematical Social Sciences

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“…There exists several popular relational axioms among which balanced contributions (Myerson, 1980) and balanced cycle contributions (Kamijo and Kongo, 2010). The common characteristic of these two axioms is that they evaluate the consequences of removing a player from a TU-game on the payoff of some other players.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Any linear and symmetric value satisfies both axioms. Kamijo and Kongo (2010) characterize the Shapley value by efficiency, null player out (Derks and Haller, 1999) and balanced cycle contributions. We prove that balanced cycle contributions under nullification, efficiency and the null player axiom characterize the Shapley value on the class of TUgames containing at least one null player.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Axiomatic characterizations under players nullification

Béal¹,

Ferrières

Rémila³

et al. 2016

Mathematical Social Sciences

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“…In addition, research cooperation, the enterprise bargaining power is higher than most universities and research institutes.so, in a dominant position of enterprises will consider seeking potential long-term cooperation, sacrifice their own short-term interests, give more benefits of space science research party. Thus, Shapley value method of distribution of interests in the new environment will be the presence of certain non-adaptive [22][23] . Thus, the traditional Shapley value distribution model is applied research in the interests of cooperation, its lack of respect for the members of the importance of factors and lack of bargaining power and other considerations will be more prominent, it exacerbated the inequities alliance practical sense.…”

Section: Description Model Updatingmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Research on Distribution of Benefits in the Cooperation of Enterprises, Colleges and Institutes Based on Shapley Model

Cai¹,

Liu²

2016

Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Economics and Management Innovations

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Based on the analysis of influence factors of distribution of benefits in the collaborative innovation of enterprises, colleges and institutes, improved Shapley value is proposed based on the revised intervals, the research collaborative innovation research interests allocation problem ,and the distribution of benefits were studied by using Shapley value model. Firstly, Shapley value model was described and analyzed in this paper. Then according to the characteristics of collaborative innovation of enterprises, colleges and institutes, and union bargaining power，project risk factors, project completion, etc. were evaluated by introducing intervals, and penalty function and excitation function were established to correct the Shapley value model .Ultimately through a case study, it can confirm that the Shapley value model based on the revised intervals established in this paper is effective and fair.

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Axiomatization of the Shapley value using the balanced cycle contributions property

Abstract: Axiomatization, Balanced cycle contributions property, Shapley value,

Cited by 27 publications

References 6 publications

Preserving or removing special players: What keeps your payoff unchanged in TU-games?

Preserving or removing special players: What keeps your payoff unchanged in TU-games?

Axiomatic characterizations under players nullification

The Research on Distribution of Benefits in the Cooperation of Enterprises, Colleges and Institutes Based on Shapley Model

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