<b>Wolfgang Schroeder / Bernhard Weßels (Hrsg.),</b> Handbuch Arbeitgeber- und Wirtschaftsverbände in Deutschland. 2. Aufl. Wiesbaden: Springer VS 2017, 725 S., gb., 74,99 €

Haipeter, Thomas

doi:10.1515/srsr-2017-0060

Cited by 2 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…In the metals sector, smaller firms tend to supply larger ones, rather than the other way around. Given the quasi-monopolistic relationship between purchasers and suppliers in the sector, the purchasers could dictate prices, and did so increasingly ruthlessly (Haipeter, 2017: 308). ‘We have to deliver on terms that are brutally forced upon us’ ( Spiegel , 13 March 1995: 105), 6 was a typical statement in that context.…”

Section: The Cumulation Of Shocks In the 1990smentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The intention was to send signals in two directions: to trade unions and to smaller member firms. With OT, employers’ associations could credibly make the threat that if trade unions made wage demands that were too ambitious and resisted the introduction of more opening clauses, this would push coverage rates down – a strategy pursued in particular by Werner Stumpfe, Gesamtmetall president between 1996 and 2000 (Haipeter, 2017: 312). 7 Equally important was the signal this move sent to small members: ‘See, we have finally discovered an instrument that will discipline trade unions.…”

Section: A New Path: Ot Membershipsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Why does Germany abstain from statutory bargaining extensions? Explaining the exceptional German erosion of collective wage bargaining

Günther

Höpner

2022

Economic and Industrial Democracy

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Against the European trend, German statutory collective bargaining extensions (SBEs) have decreased in the last two decades, contributing to the exceptional erosion of German wage-bargaining coverage. This article distinguishes between two liberalization dynamics: an intrasectoral dynamic that started with the introduction of employers’ association memberships outside the scope of collective agreements, and an intersectoral dynamic. The latter is the result of an abnormal German institutional feature, the veto power of the employers’ umbrella association in the committees that have to approve SBE applications. Activation of this veto enabled employers to promote collective bargaining erosion in sectors other than their own, in order to contain cost pressures. This intersectoral liberalization dynamic has been part of Germany’s transition into an asymmetrically export-driven growth regime and could be stopped by means of political reforms.

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Section: The Cumulation Of Shocks In the 1990smentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: A New Path: Ot Membershipsmentioning

confidence: 99%