1997
DOI: 10.1057/9780230378940
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Backbench Debate within the Conservative Party and its Influence on British Foreign Policy, 1948–57

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Cited by 29 publications
(4 citation statements)
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“…The Conservatives had since 1945 been wary of Churchill's pro-Europe stance as an electoral liability and others found it difficult to reconcile this with their leader's pro-Empire sentiments, which also alienated many new Conservatives. 28 The effectiveness of his often self-lauded diplomacy with the Americans and Russians, viewed from both sides, was of questionable relevance. Indeed, Churchill was sometimes admonished by the Cabinet for his 'personal diplomacy', including an almost censorious reprimand for ignoring Cabinet and sending despatches to the new Soviet leadership in March 1953.…”
Section: The Right Man?mentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…The Conservatives had since 1945 been wary of Churchill's pro-Europe stance as an electoral liability and others found it difficult to reconcile this with their leader's pro-Empire sentiments, which also alienated many new Conservatives. 28 The effectiveness of his often self-lauded diplomacy with the Americans and Russians, viewed from both sides, was of questionable relevance. Indeed, Churchill was sometimes admonished by the Cabinet for his 'personal diplomacy', including an almost censorious reprimand for ignoring Cabinet and sending despatches to the new Soviet leadership in March 1953.…”
Section: The Right Man?mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…31 Eden's mastery and experience of foreign affairs even rivalled the curriculum vitae of his leader. The foreign secretary's successes in Indo-China, Trieste and Iran meant that 'never had his standing within the party in the country been higher', 32 while Churchill created '[b]ackbench dissatisfaction' by being surrounded by 'old cronies, giving little opportunity to post-war entrants . .…”
Section: The Right Man?mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The first benefit is range. In looking at the event now simply known as Suez, for example, I draw on studies of the crisis attuned to the role of political rhetoric and discourse and, for additional context, on studies dealing with the press and the parties, including their "backbench tribes" (e.g., Onslow 1997;Mattern 2005;Towle 2009;McCourt 2014b;Thomas and Toye 2017). Similarly, I pay close attention to secondary interpretations of "paths not taken," "missteps," and "missed opportunities," meaning the conditions under which British leaders could have legitimately broken alternative paths, such as "more Europe" or alignment with Washington à la française.…”
Section: Table 2 About Herementioning
confidence: 99%
“…On the Conservative benches a number of key politicians advocated unity, but intergovernmental co-operation was preferred over federalism. 13 To investigate further how these party positions were constructed and defended, we will first turn to the use of the idea of federalism in the parliamentary debates during the war.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%