Backlash politics against European integration

Abstract

The answer to the question whether opposition to the European integration process is an example of backlash politics is an ambiguous one. While the Euroscepticism from the radical right qualifies for backlash politics, the Euroscepticism from the radical left does not at first sight, although it also shows some traces of this kind of politics. Both the radical left and the radical right mobilise political discontent and are part of a ‘populist backlash’, but it is only the ‘nationalistic backlash’ against European integration of the radical right which qualifies as a politics with a retrograde objective. The argument is illustrated by the case of Brexit, the British version of the ‘nationalistic backlash’.

Conceptualising backlash politics: Introduction to a special issue on backlash politics in comparison

“…Whereas the previous contributions consider a similar shock that generates divergent responses, Hanspieter Kriesi’s (2020) article A Backlash against European Integration? explains that it can be problematic to see a similar domestic reaction – Euro-scepticism – as a form of backlash against European integration.…”

Theorising backlash politics: Conclusion to a special issue on backlash politics in comparison

“…According to Deitelhoff, the failure to address African concerns helped transform contested politics into backlash politics. Hanspeter Kriesi (2020) identified complaints against the EU coming from the political left and right. His analysis suggested that addressing concerns on the left through policy change might quell some leftist Euroscepticism but not only did this not happen for a long time, reforms that pleased leftist critics may have had no effect or a counter-productive impact on rightist Euroscepticism.…”

Backlash against the procedural consensus

“…Insofar as European integration has at least in the old member states been part of the dominant script and its institutions and policies subject to an at least permissive consensus, these attacks are also clearly extraordinary and have passed a popular threshold that has already unleased a transformative dynamic. It thus clearly makes sense to talk about backlash politics against the EU and other trans- and international institutions (see Kriesi, 2020). Already, we can witness how the procedural consensus these had been subject to dwindles, leading a loss of decision-making capacity and reduced performance.…”

“…The backlash against the EU may be another example of a looming redefinition of the status quo (see Kriesi, 2020). The integration process and the institutions of the EU can be and are criticised on both substantive and procedural grounds.…”

“…The integration process and the institutions of the EU can be and are criticised on both substantive and procedural grounds. As Kriesi (2020) argues, the substantive criticism that is aimed at austerity requirements and the lack of solidarity and redistribution and which is voiced predominantly in Southern Europe and by left-wing parties and politicians does not constitute a backlash, but rather a case of ordinary and legitimate contestation on the basis of procedural consensus on the European project as such. By contrast, the assault against the EU that is led by right-wing populists in Northern and Western European countries has procedural implications that puts to question the European project and the idea of supra-national decision-making as such, and in this sense qualifies as a backlash movement.…”