Backwards Causation in Social Institutions

Abstract

Whereas many philosophers take backwards causation to be impossible, the few who maintain its possibility either take it to be absent from the actual world or else confined to theoretical physics. Here, however, I argue that backwards causation is not only actual, but common, though occurring in the context of our social institutions. After juxtaposing my cases with a few others in the literature and arguing that we should take seriously the reality of causal cases in these contexts, I consider several objections. These objections involve whether the cases should be reinterpreted, whether they are properly within the institution, whether they involve necessitation or else Cambridge changes, whether and how they involve changing the past, and whether this should call us to question institutional reality. I end by suggesting that it is a virtue of our institutions that they allow backwards causation, that this is a kind of technology that they are often built to incorporate.

Rewriting History: Backwards Causation and Conflicting Declarations Among Institutional Facts

“…In his wonderfully thought-provoking article "Backwards Causation in Social Institutions", Silver (2022) argues that if we take so-called "institutional facts" seriously, then we are led to conclude that backwards causation is not only possible, but commonplace. As such, Silver is not the first to argue that backwards causation is logically possible (others who have argued this include Dummett, 1954Dummett, , 1964Lewis, 1976;Roache, 2009;Tooley, 1999), nor is he the first to argue that backwards causation is actual (Dowe, 1997;Price, 1997;and Corry, 2015, for example, have suggested that backwards causation may account for the weirdness found in quantum mechanics), and nor is he the first to argue that backwards causation might occur amongst institutional facts (Barlassina & Del Prete, 2015;and Torrengo, 2018 suggest this also).…”