Bacteria without Borders: Communicable Disease Politics in Europe

Abstract

Communicable disease control might be one of the oldest and most important functions of the modern state, but it receives very little attention today. This article introduces a special issue on the Europeanization of communicable disease control politics in Europe. The Europeanization of communicable disease control is a case of both European integration and communicable disease politics. We first analyze the problems and tensions in communicable disease control as a problem of overlapping interprofessional, interorganizational, intergovernmental, and international tensions. We then present the European Union, a new and understudied actor in communicable disease politics, sketching the theoretical background for Europeanization of the field and introducing the articles in the special issue.

The European Union Joint Procurement Agreement for cross-border health threats: what is the potential for this new mechanism of health system collaboration?

“…Thus, networking between health technology procurement experts for exchange of information and best practices could well be one of the most unintended, yet important, outcomes from the JPA particularly for the smaller MS where professional isolation often emerges as a significant issue. The creation of professional expert networks has been shown to be a driver for the development of European health policy in communicable disease control where technical rational argumentation served to drive political action (Greer and Matzke, 2012: 887–914). The forerunners of the European Centre for Disease Control were actually networks of experts coordinating information, research and developing guidelines at European level.…”

The COVID-19 crisis and the rise of the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC)

“…Perception of the issue evolved in the early 2000s due to the accumulation of health crises that were inherited from the 1990s (such as 'Mad Cow' disease) as well as the increasingly important question of bioterrorism (European Commission 2003a, 2003b. At the end of 2001, amid concern regarding bioterrorism, we observe an informal institutional development with the creation of the Health Security Committee (HSC): the informal group convening health ministry representatives (Greer and Mätzke 2012). With this marked focus on health threats in the Council, the question of the creation of an agency able to identify threats became more tangible.…”

“…This article investigates the catalytic impact of the COVID-19 crisis on the EU's capacity to coordinate risk management and more specifically the expansion of the mandate of the ECDC over time. The Centre's mandate is, as per its founding regulation (Regulation No 851/2004), restricted to risk assessment -the surveillance of risks to human health from communicable diseases -and it specifically excludes risk management from its purview (Greer and Mätzke 2012). The coordination of vaccination and containment measures such as confinement remain the prerogative of the Commission and the HSC.…”

“…This would be an important change for the ECDC and the governance of health threats in the EU: the Centre's mandate (Regulation No 851/2004) is -so far -restricted to the surveillance of risks to human health from communicable diseases. It specifically excludes risk management (Greer and Mätzke 2012). Treatments such as vaccination and NPI such as confinement have remained the prerogative of national authorities.…”

Historia de dos epidemias: una respuesta basada en derechos

“…Tanto en el caso del VIH como del SARS-CoV-2 estamos ante agentes biológicos que pueden transmitirse o contagiarse a terceras personas, causándoles daños que pueden llegar a ser graves e irreparables en su salud, y que pueden ser epidémicos, afectando negativamente a la salud pública, entendida como la salud de toda la población y no como un simple sumatorio de la salud individual. Al igual que otras enfermedades crónicas u otras discapacidades que no pueden comunicarse a terceras personas o que no pueden causar una epidemia, las enfermedades que sí pueden hacerlo también han tenido algún tipo de respuesta normativa (Aginam, 2002;Magnusson, Patterson 2011;Greer y Mätzke, 2012), que en la actualidad debe enmarcarse en el respeto del principio del imperio de la ley que es consustancial a todo Estado de derecho. Un brote epidémico de un agente biológico comunicable puede, además, generar una situación de anormalidad democrática que implique que el Gobierno, respetando el imperio de la ley, necesite adoptar determinadas decisiones que limiten, restrinjan o invadan el ejercicio de los derechos y libertades por la ciudadanía (Gostin, 2005).…”