Bad Faith is Necessarily Social

Eshleman, Matthew C.

doi:10.3167/ssi.2008.140203

Sartre Studies International

2008

DOI: 10.3167/ssi.2008.140203

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Bad Faith is Necessarily Social

Matthew C. Eshleman¹

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“…35 35 This is yet another crucial social aspect in Sartre's theory of bad faith, which has so far not been sufficiently recognized; for different emphases on the sociality of bad faith (as conceived in Being and Nothingness ), see Eshleman (2008), and cf. Santoni (2008), and again Webber (2009).…”

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Epistemically exploitative bullshit: A Sartrean account

Szanto

2022

European J of Philosophy

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This paper presents a novel conceptualization of a type of untruthful speech that is of eminent political relevance but has hitherto been unrecognized: epistemically exploitative bullshit (EEB). Speakers engaging in EEB are bullshitting: they deceive their addressee regarding their unconcern for the very difference between truth and falsity. At the same time, they exploit their discursive victims: they oblige their counterparts to perform unacknowledged and emotionally draining epistemic work to educate the speakers about the addressees' oppression, only to discredit their epistemic trustworthiness. I argue that EEB is irreducible to various recently discussed untruthful speech, and in particular to Frankfurtian bullshit, as well as to epistemic exploitation or other epistemic injustices. Taking inspiration from Sartre's analysis of anti‐Semitic discourse, where bullshitting and epistemic exploitation are essentially interlinked, I instead suggest that recognizing the distinctiveness of EEB allows for a more refined conceptualization of these discursive phenomena. Specifically, I show how bad faith and the ensuing collective diffusion and delegation of epistemic responsibility play a so far neglected but key role here. I ultimately demonstrate that with Sartre's help, we can grasp how the existential, interpersonal and institutional dimensions involved in the negotiation of truth seamlessly intersect better than we would with the lens of analytic or critical epistemology alone.

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Epistemically exploitative bullshit: A Sartrean account

Szanto

2022

European J of Philosophy

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“…Illuminating discussions of bad faith can be found in Bernasconi (, Ch. 4), Cox (, 101–04), Eshleman (,b), Manser (), Perna (), Santoni (; ), and Webber ().…”

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Emotions in Early Sartre: The Primacy of Frustration

Elpidorou¹

2017

Midwest Stud Philos

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“…For more on bad faith, see Bernasconi , ch. 4; Cox , 101‐4; Eshleman and ; Manser ; Perna ; Santoni and ; and Webber and 2010.…”

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Horror, Fear, and the Sartrean Account of Emotions

Elpidorou¹

2016

The Southern J of Philosophy

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University ofAbstract Phenomenological approaches to affectivity have long recognized the vital role that emotions occupy in our lives. In this paper, I engage with Jean-Paul Sartre's well-known and highly influential theory of the emotions as it is advanced in his Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions. I examine whether Sartre's account offers two inconsistent explications of the nature of emotions. I argue that despite appearances there is a reading of Sartre's theory that is free of inconsistencies. Ultimately, I highlight a novel reading of Sartre's account of the emotions: one that is phenomenologically accurate, free of inconsistencies, and that enjoys the support of textual evidence.

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Bad Faith is Necessarily Social

Cited by 3 publications

References 0 publications

Epistemically exploitative bullshit: A Sartrean account

Epistemically exploitative bullshit: A Sartrean account

Emotions in Early Sartre: The Primacy of Frustration

Horror, Fear, and the Sartrean Account of Emotions

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