Balanced Budget Rules and Public Deficits: Evidence from the U.S. States

Bohn, Henning; Inman, Robert P.

doi:10.3386/w5533

Cited by 171 publications

(178 citation statements)

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“…As suggested by Mitchell (1967) or Bohn and Inman (1996) these characteristics may affect the fiscal stance for the following reasons. First, since State Courts are responsible for the enforcement of budget rules, it is conceivable that enforcement is less than perfect and monitoring looser whenever Courts are appointed by those who also legislate the budget.…”

Section: Characterizing Restrictions On Government Behaviormentioning

confidence: 97%

“…To account for these differences, we follow Bohn and Inman (1996), and construct three indicators capturing different aspects of deficit constraints. In the first (Ex-ante), an entry of one is given to states where the governor must submit or the legislature must pass a balance budget and zero to the others.…”

Section: Characterizing Restrictions On Government Behaviormentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Poterba (1994) and Bohn and Inman (1996); Von Hagen (1991), Milesi-Ferretti and Moriyama (2004) and Von Hagen and Wolff (2004) have an opposite view), the macroeconomic consequences of imposing fiscal constraints have not been fully explored. Sorensen, Wu and Yosha (2001), Gali and Perotti (2003), Fatas and Mihov (2003), and Lane (2003) have examined some aspects of the relationship between fiscal variables and the macroeconomy, but to the best of our knowledge, no study has thoroughly measured whether fiscal constraints alter the business cycle features of macroeconomic variables and/or provide an insurance against excessive levels of public deficits and debt.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Elusive Costs and the Immaterial Gains of Fiscal Constraints

Canova

Pappa

2004

SSRN Journal

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We study whether fiscal restrictions affect volatilities and correlations of macrovariables and the probability of excessive debt for a sample of 48 US states. Fiscal constraints are characterized with a number of indicators and volatility and correlations are computed in several ways. The second moments of macroeconomic variables in states with different fiscal constraints are economically and statistically similar. Excessive debt and the mechanism linking budget deficit and excessive debts are independent of whether tight or loose fiscal constraints are in place. Creative budget accounting may account for the results. JEL classification numbers: E3, E5, H7

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Section: Characterizing Restrictions On Government Behaviormentioning

confidence: 97%

Section: Characterizing Restrictions On Government Behaviormentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Elusive Costs and the Immaterial Gains of Fiscal Constraints

Canova

Pappa

2004

SSRN Journal

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“…In addition, white majorities extensively entertained the practice of "white primaries" 13 . By the early 1900's the number of 12 All voters were white male according to the Naturalization Law of 1790. See Data Appendix for details.…”

Section: Statesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We refer the reader to Persson and Tabellini (2003) for a survey of the cross-country literature. On US states see in particular Alt and Lowry (1994), Poterba (1994), and Bohn and Inman (1996) amongst others. Mulligan and Sala I Martin (2004) offer a dissenting view, namely that policies are determined by lobbying pressure that are not much affected by institutional forms of government.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Choosing Electoral Rules: Theory and Evidence from US Cities

Aghion

Alesina

2005

SSRN Journal

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This paper studies the choice of electoral rules, in particular, the question of minority representation.Majorities tend to disenfranchise minorities through strategic manipulation of electoral rules. With the aim of explaining changes in electoral rules adopted by US cities (particularly in the South), we show why majorities tend to adopt "winner-take-all" city-wide rules (at-large elections) in response to an increase in the size of the minority when the minority they are facing is relatively small. In this case, for the majority it is more effective to leverage on its sheer size instead of risking to concede representation to voters from minority-elected districts. However, as the minority becomes larger (closer to a fifty-fifty split), the possibility of losing the whole city induces the majority to prefer minority votes to be confined in minority-packed districts. Single-member district rules serve this purpose. We show empirical results consistent with these implications of the model.

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How interest groups lobby to influence budget outcomes in Zambia

Bwalya¹,

Phiri

Mpembamoto

2011

J of Intl Development

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This paper examines the nature of state–business relations and how interest groups utilise the budget process to lobby for tax and expenditure policies in Zambia, using information compiled from budget proposals interest groups submit towards the budget and lobbying activity data published in the daily newspapers between 2006 and 2008. The data shows a significant increase in interest groups formed especially in the civil society segmented and improvements in state–business relations, although not formalised and institutionalised, since political liberalisation in 1991. Analysis of lobbying data indicates that interest groups utilise the formal budget processes and informal policy networks such as the media to lobby unilaterally and collectively for favourable tax and expenditure policies. Tax proposals submitted through government departments had a greater chance of being adopted in the budget as bureaucrats assisted to shepherd them through the budget process. Copyright (C) 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.interest groups , lobbying , state–business relations , budget process , Zambia , D72, H30 ,

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Balanced Budget Rules and Public Deficits: Evidence from the U.S. States

Cited by 171 publications

References 0 publications

The Elusive Costs and the Immaterial Gains of Fiscal Constraints

The Elusive Costs and the Immaterial Gains of Fiscal Constraints

Choosing Electoral Rules: Theory and Evidence from US Cities

How interest groups lobby to influence budget outcomes in Zambia

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