Balancing upstream–downstream interests in flood risk management: experiences from a catchment‐based approach in Austria

Abstract

River floods usually do not stop at administrative borders. The respective location of municipalities along a river creates different options and dependencies, commonly referred to as upstream–downstream relations. This regional dimension of flood risk calls for catchment‐based approaches in flood risk management as advocated by the EU Flood Directive. In this article, we present and assess the case of an intermunicipal cooperation in Austria which aims to alleviate flood risk and coordinate planning activities based on a catchment approach. The authors apply an established model of water governance to characterise the governance features and to assess the governance qualities and governance capacities of the intermunicipal cooperation. Findings show that the selected case qualifies as a suitable governance instrument to address the main policy objectives. Existing functional ties, shared (flooding) experiences, and mutual trust mark key success factors, indicating that proximity – in its many different forms – is crucial to overcome power asymmetries and spatial misfits in catchment‐based flood risk management. However, intermunicipal cooperation is weak when it comes to ensuring binding land use regulations, showing the need for a complementary use of governance arrangements and formal instruments of regional land use planning in flood risk management.

Effects of government flood expenditures: the problem of crowding‐out

“…Furthermore, Raška and Brázdil (), p. 13) conclude their historical examination of risk‐reduction measures in Bohemia as follows: ‘…[M]otivation to adopt private mitigation measures in the postcommunist countries is low because of the centralisation and institutionalisation of the risk reduction strategies during the communist period’. It is interesting to confront this postsocialist reality with the situation in Austria or England (see McCarthy et al ., or Seher and Löschner, within this special issue).…”

Compensating Flood Retention on Private Land in Austria: Towards Polycentric Governance in Flood Risk Management?

“…On one hand, they represent the public interest; on the other hand, it is their task to coordinate and balance stakeholder interests and to negotiate a viable compensation scheme. Municipalities can cooperate in water associations under public law (Wasserverbände), as defined in Article 87 of Federal Water Act (Wasserrechtsgesetz, WRG for short) [25] , in order to better address upstreamdownstream interdependencies and improve the "spatial fit" of flood management in river catchments [26] [27] . The basis for [24] 。在滞洪补偿方面，市政府扮演着中间方 的重要角色：既要代表公共利益，也要在各利益相关方之间进行协调 和平衡，以商定切实可行的补偿方案。根据《联邦水法》(WRG) [25] 第87条的规定，市政府可以与公法承认的水务协会开展合作，从而更 好地协调上下游的相互依赖关系，并制定出更符合当地实际情况的流 划》中划定合适的滞洪区域 [25] 。政府可根据洪水灾害地图及相关洪水 风险管理计划制定防洪措施。不过，根据WRG，确保防洪安全的义务 主要由受影响的滨河区域利益相关方承担，而非政府。因此，地方层 级的"利益相关方"(以市政府为代表)负责制定防洪方案，而联邦 和州政府只需为方案实施提供必要的资金(和法律)支持。根据《水 利工程开发法案》 [28] 的规定，地方需要承担的资金支出因河流类型而 异。一般情况下，联邦政府承担总支出的50％，州政府和市级政府分 别承担30％和20％。部分情况下，联邦政府需要承担绝大部分甚至全 部支出，剩余部分才由市政府、水务协会和/或相关受益者分担。如果 市政府无力承担相应的支出，联邦政府和州政府的出资份额便会相应 增加 [29] 。 尤为重要的是，由于洪水往往会影响大量滨河土地所有者，WRG 建议：1)成立主要由各市政府组成的水务协会，或主要由个人和非政 府利益相关者组成的水务合作组织；2)由受益者分摊防洪措施所需的 资金和维护费用 [25] 。这类水务或防洪合作组织拥有明确的法律地位(即 符合公法规定的法律实体)，拥有自己的管理委员会，并按照一定的 规则条例运营，如制定协作目标和成本分摊机制 [30] 。防洪合作组织在急 流沿岸地区较为普遍，在大型河流沿岸地区则不常见 [31] 。 在此背景下，下文中的滞洪补偿方案可看作一个较有代表性的个 例。该案例体现了防洪合作组织在制定基于"受益者补偿原则"的筹 资方案时发挥的重要作用-这种方案对传统洪灾防护中的共同筹资 模式进行了补充 [32] ；同时展示了在奥地利洪水风险治理中相关机构与权 力向更低层级的政府和非政府行为主体转移的过程。 flood retention compensation is defined in the following legal frameworks:…”

Land for flood risk management: A catchment‐wide and cross‐disciplinary perspective

“…This helps to identify new policy instruments to deal with flood risk management on the catchment scale. Finally, Seher and Löschner (this issue) address the issue of land governance on the catchment scale. Their contribution concludes that governance approaches such as upstream–downstream negotiations demand for combination with formal instruments of land policy.…”