2022
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.4197344
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Bank Monitoring in Construction Lending

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Cited by 3 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…In Brazil, the literature had investigated the effect of collaterals on consumer credit (Assunção et al, 2014;Doornik and Capelletto, 2015;Ponticelli & Alencar, 2016), whereas we provide evidence on how an efficient collateral recovery can expand the access to production loans. We provide evidence that superior collateral can be a complement when monitoring is costly (when banks' physical presence is smaller), contributing to the literature on loan monitoring (Diamond, 1984;Heitz et al, 2022). Finally, our paper contributes to the vast literature on the relationship between collaterals and bank loans (Bester, 1985;Cerqueiro et al, 2016;Tirole, 2005) and theories that link financial development to economic growth, such as Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Duygan-Bump et al (2015).…”
Section: Introductonmentioning
confidence: 55%
“…In Brazil, the literature had investigated the effect of collaterals on consumer credit (Assunção et al, 2014;Doornik and Capelletto, 2015;Ponticelli & Alencar, 2016), whereas we provide evidence on how an efficient collateral recovery can expand the access to production loans. We provide evidence that superior collateral can be a complement when monitoring is costly (when banks' physical presence is smaller), contributing to the literature on loan monitoring (Diamond, 1984;Heitz et al, 2022). Finally, our paper contributes to the vast literature on the relationship between collaterals and bank loans (Bester, 1985;Cerqueiro et al, 2016;Tirole, 2005) and theories that link financial development to economic growth, such as Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Duygan-Bump et al (2015).…”
Section: Introductonmentioning
confidence: 55%
“…No Brasil, a literatura tinha investigado o efeito das garantias no crédito ao consumo (Assunção et al, 2014;Doornik e Capelletto, 2015;Ponticelli & Alencar, 2016), enquanto trazemos evidências sobre como uma recuperação de garantias eficiente pode ampliar o acesso ao crédito produtivo. Trazemos evidência de que garantias superiores podem ser complemento quando o monitoramento é custoso (quando a presença física dos bancos é menor), contribuindo para a literatura teórica e empírica sobre o monitoramento de empréstimos (Diamond, 1984;Heitz et al, 2022). Finalmente, nosso artigo contribui para a vasta literatura sobre a relação entre garantias e empréstimos bancários (Bester, 1985;Cerqueiro et al, 2016;Tirole, 2005) e com as teorias que ligam o desenvolvimento financeiro ao crescimento econômico, como Rajan e Zingales (1998) e Duygan-Bump et al (2015).…”
Section: Introductionunclassified
“…Heitz, Martin, and Ufier (2022) provide empirical evidence that bank monitoring (e.g., via on-site inspections) andNini, Smith, and Sufi (2012) that actions taken by creditors improve borrower performance, lending support to our modelling in (39) that a t boosts firm performance.31 Note that an infinite cost of effort, i.e., κ → ∞, implies a t = 0, thus giving our baseline case.32 While this model extension relates to dynamic agency models with moral hazard over monitoring(Piskorski and Westerfield, 2016;Malenko, 2019;Gryglewicz, Mayer, and Morellec, 2021), the key novelty is that it considers a financially constrained principal, here the firm's shareholders.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%