Bank ownership and connected lending

Collectivism and connected lending

“…The coefficient of Hofstede Collectivism is always positive but is not always statistically significant. This suggests that the need for special connections with banks is different from the corruption of bank officials as suggested by Dheera-aumpon (2013Dheera-aumpon ( , 2016. Specifically, Hofstede Collectivism was significantly positively related to the corruption of bank official, as shown by Zheng et al (2013), but it was not significantly related to the need for special connections with banks, as shown in this paper.…”

“…The corruption of bank officials not only undermines the integrity of bank lending, but also the prevalence of connected lending. It has been investigated by a number of studies such as Charumilind, Kali, and Wiwattanakantang (2006), Cull, Haber, and Imai (2011), Dheera-aumpon (2013Dheera-aumpon ( , 2016, Hamada and Konishi (2010), La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Zamarripa (2003), Laeven (2001), and Maurer and Haber (2007). All of these except Dheera-aumpon (2013,2016) are country-focused studies.…”

“…All of these except Dheera-aumpon (2013,2016) are country-focused studies. Conversely, Dheera-aumpon (2013Dheera-aumpon ( , 2016 uses cross-country data on firms' perceptions of the need for special connections with banks to measure the prevalence of connected lending. Similar to the corruption of bank officials, Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2005) found the need for special connections with banks to lower firm growth rates.…”

Humane Orientation and Corruption in Bank Lending

“…The response takes a value of one if the answer is no obstacle, a value of two if it is minor obstacle, a value of three if it is moderate obstacle, and the value of four if it is major obstacle. It is important to note that the corruption of bank officials is different from the need for special connections with banks as shown by Dheera-aumpon (2013Dheera-aumpon ( , 2016.…”

Bank ownership concentration and stock price informativeness: International evidence

“…Entrenched controlling shareholders have the incentive to cover up their self-serving behaviour by withholding unfavourable information or selectively disclosing information that helps them camouflage such behaviour by opportunistically timing the release of value-relevant private information to the market. Dheera-aumpon (2016) shows that the excess control rights of banks' controlling owners can tempt them to engage more in connected lending, because the excess control rights give them controlling power without the cost of a greater stake in the potential loss from connected loans.…”