Banking Across Borders: Are Chinese Banks Different?

In Search of Global Determinants of National Credit-to-GDP Gaps

“…These countries tend to perform central roles in the networks of cross-border bank claims, being significant global lenders and/or borrowers. Namely, Cerutti et al (2020) provide such evidence for China, while Atyabi et al (2020) also includes Japan and France in the cohort of top drivers of the global banking network. Spain and Italy are still recognized as top lenders/borrowers, though their positions in the global banking network have not consolidated after the global financial crisis (Cerutti and Zhou 2017).…”

Internationalism in climate action and China’s role

“…In addition to the development of the domestic banking sector, Chinese banks' international footprint has expanded substantially, mirroring the growth in the country's broader engagement in the international financial system. China's cross-border lending stands at around 18% of Chinese GDP, with 43% going to borrowers from EMDEs (Cerutti et al 2020). Chinese banks have become the most important creditor for 66 of 185 borrower countries, more than any other banking system, and are the largest cross-border creditors for almost half of all EMDEs (63 out of 143) (figure 6).…”

Financial globalisation in ASEAN+3: Navigating the financial trilemma

“…Further, the LBS data also offers a breakdown of whether the cross-border transactions involve bank or non-bank counterparts.14 In particular, there is clearly a need for regional economies to further develop the requisite infrastructure for foreign exchange (FX) swap markets which have been important sourcing channels for US dollars but came under significant pressure both during the heights of GFC as well as more recently in the immediate period after the global Covid-19 outbreak.15 It is worth noting that loans to non-bank counterparts have risen partly due to the increase in financing for infrastructure-related projects.16 In this latter context, although the diversification of sources of funds is positive for ASEAN, the Japanese banks also deal in US dollars, and to some extent, their funding patterns, reliant largely on short-term sources, make them more susceptible to adverse spillover effects of the US' macro-financial management(Rosario & Sun, 2019). 17 SeeCerutti et al (2020) for a discussion of rising Chinese bank presence globally and if and how the outward reach of Chinese banks may differ from those from advanced economies. 18 Note here that the most updated data for digital payments made in Vietnam in 2021 is not available in the World Bank's 2021 Global Findex Database, but based on figures from 2014 and 2017, around 21% of its population aged 15 and above has ever made or received a digital payment.19 They are quite well-established and popular in Europe and some larger Asian economies such as India and Japan -but have only just began their journey in southeast Asia(Christensen, 2019).20 The full digital banking licences (awarded to Sea Limited and a consortium of Grab and Singtel) enable licensees to engage in the full spectrum of banking services offered by traditional banks, whilst the wholesale licences (awarded to Ant Group and a consortium of Greenland Financial Holdings, Linklogis Hong Kong, and Beijing Co-operative Equity Investment Fund) are geared towards facilitating provision of credit to small and medium enterprises (SMEs).21 Since the emergence of digital banks, fintechs, and Big Techs in finance has been a relatively recent phenomenon, reliable, accurate, and standardised data on the cross-border financial flows…”