Bargaining agenda in a unionised monopoly with network effects: when corporate social responsibility may be welfare-reducing

Fanti, Luciano; Buccella, Domenico

doi:10.1007/s40888-016-0051-1

Cited by 14 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…where consumer surplus is We assume that firm 1 takes CSR strategy. That is, firm 1 is not only concerned with its own profits, but also with the consumer surplus and pollution damage (Fanti and Buccella, 2017, 2019Goering, 2012Goering, , 2014Lambertini and Tampieri, 2015;Ouchida, 2019;and others). Thus, the objective function of firm 1  is defined as:…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

WITHDRAWN: Optimal Licensing Strategy of Green Technology With Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)

Shang

2021

Preprint

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This paper develops a duopoly model to investigate a firm’s green technology licensing strategy with corporate social responsibility (CSR). In our model, licensing is conducted by an inside innovator and the patent holder may take CSR activities under a time-consistent emission tax. The result shows that fixed-fee licensing is always the optimal strategy of the patent holder when there is no CSR. In the CSR case, when the reduction degree of abatement cost coefficient is large, the optimal licensing strategy of the patent holder changes from pure royalty licensing to fixed-fee licensing as the degree of CSR decreases. Furthermore, we find that neither conflict nor consistency always exists between social welfare and firm payoff goals. When the degree of CSR is relatively low, fixed-fee licensing is preferred both by the patent holder and the government. Otherwise, when the degree of CSR is relatively high, the government prefers fixed-fee licensing, while the patent holder prefers royalty licensing. Finally, we analyze the effects of CSR behaviors on environment and social welfare. We show that CSR is beneficial for environment, while it is not always beneficial for social welfare.JEL Classifications: D42; M14; I13

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Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

WITHDRAWN: Optimal Licensing Strategy of Green Technology With Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)

Shang

2021

Preprint

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“…On the side of network effects, the theoretical literature on network externalities has recently seen a renewed interest with contributions that re‐examined several existing models and changed some established results of the Industrial Organisation literature. For instance, (1) Hoernig (), Bhattacharjee and Pal (), and Chirco and Scrimitore () showed that the established results of the oligopoly managerial delegation literature may not hold, (2) Fanti and Buccella (, ) found that the common wisdom regarding the bargaining agenda (between unions and firms) and corporate social responsibility may change, (3) Song and Wang () showed that the strength of the network externality affects collusion between firms, which becomes more likely when products are close substitutes.…”

Section: Literature Review On Codetermination and Network Effectsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Codetermination, Price Competition and the Network Industry

Fanti

Gori

2019

German Economic Review

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This research develops a tractable two‐stage non‐cooperative game with complete information describing the behaviour of price‐setting firms that must choose to be profit maximisers or bargainers under codetermination in a network industry with horizontal product differentiation. The existing theoretical literature has already shown that codetermination might arise as the endogenous market outcome in a strategic competitive quantity‐setting duopoly. In sharp contrast with this result, the present article shows that codetermination does never emerge as a Nash equilibrium in a price‐setting non‐network duopoly. Then, it aims at highlighting the role of network externalities in determining changes of paradigm of the game and letting codetermination become a sub‐game perfect Nash equilibrium when prices are strategic substitutes or strategic complements. This equilibrium may be Pareto efficient. Results allow distinguishing between mandatory codetermination and voluntary codetermination. The article also proposes a model of endogenous codetermination according to which every firm may choose to bargain with its own corresponding union bargaining unit only whether the firm's bargaining strength is exactly the profit‐maximising one. The equilibrium outcomes emerging in this case range from a uniform Nash equilibrium, in which both firms are codetermined, to mixed Nash equilibria, in which only one of them chooses to be codetermined. These results are ‘network depending’ and do not hold in a non‐network duopoly.

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“…Assume that firm 1 engage in CSR activities. In other words, not only firm 1 concerns its profit, but it also concerns its consumers and the damage it causes to the environment (Goering, 2012(Goering, , 2014Fanti & Buccella, 2017, 2018Ouchida, 2019;Fukuda & Ouchida, 2020). Hence, firm 1's objective function can be described as:…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal Licensing Strategy of Green Technology With Corporate Social Responsibility

Shang

Chen

2022

Technological and Economic Development of Economy

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This study investigates the green technology licensing strategies of firms with corporate social responsibility (CSR) in a duopoly market. The results show that in the absence of CSR, the optimal licensing contract is fixed-fee licensing for a patent holding firm. In the precent of CSR, the optimal licensing contract for a patent holding firm switches from fixed-fee licensing to royalty licensing with increasing level of CSR if the reduction cost of emissions is high. Moreover, we show that the profit goal of firm and the social welfare goal of government are not always mutually exclusive. If the level of CSR is low, a uniform licensing contract would be preferable. If the level of CSR is high, the optimal licensing contract is inconsistent. Finally, we show that CSR is not always beneficial to the social welfare while CSR benefits the environment. Social welfare benefits from increased CSR degree, but vice versa is true when CSR degree decreases. This research may provide valuable insights into licensing and CSR literature.

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Bargaining agenda in a unionised monopoly with network effects: when corporate social responsibility may be welfare-reducing

Cited by 14 publications

References 29 publications

WITHDRAWN: Optimal Licensing Strategy of Green Technology With Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)

WITHDRAWN: Optimal Licensing Strategy of Green Technology With Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)

Codetermination, Price Competition and the Network Industry

Optimal Licensing Strategy of Green Technology With Corporate Social Responsibility

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