Bargaining over a finite set of alternatives

Kıbrıs, Özgür; Sertel, Murat R.

doi:10.1007/s00355-006-0178-z

Cited by 30 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…Most of them take an ordinal approach and leave preference intensities out of the setting (which is a key feature of our work). Among those, sequential procedures (in particular the ''fallback'' bargaining method) have attracted a considerable interest (Sprumont, 1993;Hurwicz and Sertel, 1999;Brams and Kilgour, 2001;Anbarci, 2006;Kıbrıs and Sertel, 2007;De Clippel and Eliaz, 2012). A related literature considers problems with a finite number of alternatives and focuses on cardinal rules, as we do.…”

Section: Alternative Proceduresmentioning

confidence: 98%

Bargaining through Approval

Núñez

Laslier

2015

Journal of Mathematical Economics

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International audienceThe paper considers two-person bargaining under Approval Voting. It first proves the existence of pure strategy equilibria. Then it shows that this bargaining method ensures that both players obtain at least their mean utility level in equilibrium. Finally it proves that, provided that the players are partially honest, the mechanism triggers sincerity and ensures that no alternative Pareto dominates the outcome of the game

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Section: Alternative Proceduresmentioning

confidence: 98%

Bargaining through Approval

Núñez

Laslier

2015

Journal of Mathematical Economics

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“…12 By not offering a general model of choice, our model gains in predictive power and sheds more light on the regularities that may exist in the seemingly irrational behavior of the majority of subjects. In the next section, 10 The only exception is the axiom of "minimal connectedness" in Kıbrıs and Sertel (2007), which has the same implication as NBC.…”

Section: De Clippel and Eliazmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reason-Based Choice: A Bargaining Rationale for the Attraction and Compromise Effects

Clippel

Eliaz

2009

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Among the most important and robust violations of rationality are the attraction and the compromise effects. The compromise effect refers to the tendency of individuals to choose an intermediate option in a choice set, while the attraction effect refers to the tendency to choose an option that dominates some other options in the choice set. This paper argues that both effects may result from an individual's attempt to overcome the difficulty of making a choice in the absence of a single criterion for ranking the options. Moreover, we propose to view the resolution of this choice problem as a cooperative solution to an intrapersonal bargaining problem among different selves of an individual, where each self represents a different criterion for choosing. We first identify a set of properties that characterize those choice correspondences that coincide with our bargaining solution, for some pair of preference relations. Second, we provide a revealed-preference foundation to our bargaining solution and characterize the extent to which these two preference relations can be uniquely identified. Alternatively, our analysis may be reinterpreted as a study of (interpersonal) bilateral bargaining over a finite set of options. In that case, our results provide a new characterization, as well as testable implications, of an ordinal bargaining solution that is previously discussed in the literature under the various names of fallback bargaining, unanimity compromise, Rawlsian arbitration rule, and KantRawls social compromise. Terms of use: Documents in

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“…They generally do so by replacing certain of Nash's axioms. More recent work furthers the analysis of non-standard problems to include finite domains (Mariotti, 1998b;Xu & Yoshihara, 2006;Kıbrıs & Sertel, 2007;Peters & Vermeulen, 2010). However, a general conclusion of this work is that its goal is out of reach; this work typically fails to find a convincing solution concept that closely resemble Nash's solution and is single-valued for all finite problems.…”

Section: Nash Distributional Bargaining Conceptsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Predicting Behavior in Unstructured Bargaining with a Probability Distribution

Wolpert¹,

Bono²

2013

jair

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In experimental tests of human behavior in unstructured bargaining games, typically many joint utility outcomes are found to occur, not just one. This suggests we predict the outcome of such a game as a probability distribution. This is in contrast to what is conventionally done (e.g, in the Nash bargaining solution), which is predict a single outcome. We show how to translate Nash's bargaining axioms to provide a distribution over outcomes rather than a single outcome. We then prove that a subset of those axioms forces the distribution over utility outcomes to be a power-law distribution. Unlike Nash's original result, our result holds even if the feasible set is finite. When the feasible set is convex and comprehensive, the mode of the power law distribution is the Harsanyi bargaining solution, and if we require symmetry it is the Nash bargaining solution. However, in general these modes of the joint utility distribution are not the experimentalist's Bayesoptimal predictions for the joint utility. Nor are the bargains corresponding to the modes of those joint utility distributions the modes of the distribution over bargains in general, since more than one bargain may result in the same joint utility. After introducing distributional bargaining solution concepts, we show how an external regulator can use them to optimally design an unstructured bargaining scenario. Throughout we demonstrate our analysis in computational experiments involving flight rerouting negotiations in the National Airspace System. We emphasize that while our results are formulated for unstructured bargaining, they can also be used to make predictions for noncooperative games where the modeler knows the utility functions of the players over possible outcomes of the game, but does not know the move spaces the players use to determine those outcomes.

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Bargaining over a finite set of alternatives

Cited by 30 publications

References 14 publications

Bargaining through Approval

Bargaining through Approval

Reason-Based Choice: A Bargaining Rationale for the Attraction and Compromise Effects

Predicting Behavior in Unstructured Bargaining with a Probability Distribution

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