Bargaining over the Bomb

Spaniel, William

doi:10.1017/9781108630610

Cited by 20 publications

(10 citation statements)

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“…This captures the total package of transfers R receives if and only if it forgoes nuclear weapons pursuit. 12 Consistent with recent work on nuclear negotiations (Debs and Monteiro, 2014; Miller, 2014; Mehta, 2020; Spaniel, 2019), this includes improved diplomatic relations, sanctions relief, alliance benefits, military assistance, and economic aid. 13 R can accept or reject.…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 83%

“…Just because a state can develop nuclear weapons it does not mean that it will. The nuclear path states select depends on the availability of non-proliferation inducements (Bas and Coe, 2016; Debs and Monteiro, 2016; Mehta, 2020; Paul, 2000; Reiss, 1988; Spaniel, 2019; Volpe, 2017). Assistance or not, nuclear weapons are expensive (Schwartz, 2011).…”

Section: Motivationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Third, the model excludes a preventive war decision, which is the focal point of many existing models (Bas and Coe, 2016; Debs and Monteiro, 2014; Spaniel, 2019). Preventive war is a critical feature of some interactions, but it is not universal.…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Scientific intelligence, nuclear assistance, and bargaining

Spaniel

2021

Conflict Management and Peace Science

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Members of the non-proliferation regime give technical assistance to countries contemplating nuclear weapons. This is puzzling: it facilitates the behavior donors wish to stop, and other forms of concessions do not have this drawback. Why do it? I develop a model of uncertainty, bargaining, and nuclear proliferation. In it, assistance hastens acquisition time but also generates a signal about the recipient’s domestic nuclear proficiency. This allows donors to better calibrate other concessions to the recipient. In equilibrium, donors sometimes find the information worth sacrificing bargaining leverage for. However, despite providing information, assistance can cause proliferation if donors believe that the recipient is competent but observe a misleading signal indicating incompetence. This paper works toward understanding how scientific intelligence affects international negotiations, an underexplored subject matter for political scientists.

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Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 83%

Section: Motivationmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Scientific intelligence, nuclear assistance, and bargaining

Spaniel

2021

Conflict Management and Peace Science

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“…Under threat of preventive war or sanctions, states may roll back existing technical infrastructure or abandon planned advances. Strategic concessions may also create incentives for states to limit technical capability (Spaniel, 2019;Mehta, 2020). The end result is the same: technical capacity is constrained as the result of a nonproliferation deal.…”

Section: Observed Constraint and Nonproliferation Mechanismsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Work in this vein indicates a variety of inducements used to alter incentives and prevent proliferation. On the positive side, conciliatory policies reduce risks of proliferation (Paul, 2000;Debs & Monteiro, 2016;Bas & Coe, 2018;Spaniel, 2019;Mehta, 2020). Opponents offer the time-adjusted benefits of nuclear weapons.…”

Section: Observed Constraint and Nonproliferation Mechanismsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Do nonproliferation agreements constrain?

Smith

Spaniel

2021

Journal of Peace Research

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One way nuclear agreements might keep signatories from proliferating is by constraining nuclear capacity. Theoretical work on nonproliferation often points to such constraints as an important driver of nonproliferation success. Some have argued that, absent sufficient constraint, states with the desire and capability to proliferate will do so. Faced with more costly routes to a weapon, states subject to technological constraint may abide by the terms of the deal. This perspective poses an important empirical question: do nonproliferation agreements result in significant technological constraint in practice? This article evaluates the empirical prevalence of constraints arising from nonproliferation deals. Doing so requires (1) providing an appropriate measure of nuclear proficiency and (2) developing an estimate of the counterfactual, no-agreement capacity of states that received such agreements. This study addresses both of these points. First, new data are gathered to estimate proficiency, improving upon existing measures in the literature. Second, the generalized synthetic control method is applied to estimate counterfactual proficiency levels for the recipients of agreements. With this approach, the constraining effects of deals the United States implemented with Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan and the Declaration of Iguaçu between Brazil and Argentina are evaluated. The findings indicate that the constraining effect of these nonproliferation agreements is minimal.

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Leveraging towards restraint: Nuclear hedging and North Korea's shifting reference points during the agreed framework and the Six-Party Talks

Park

Peh

2019

Eur. j. of int. secur.

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The emergence of new nuclear aspirants has posed a great threat to the post-Cold War global non-proliferation regime. These states have adopted a nuclear hedging strategy that has been deemed both strategically risky and politically difficult to maintain. Yet, hedging has not automatically resulted in nuclearisation. We analyse the conditions under which a nuclear hedger shifts its nuclear policy towards one of restraint. Drawing insights from prospect theory, we argue that a nuclear policy shift occurs when a nuclear hedger gains an asymmetric leverage vis-à-vis its adversary. Specifically, a hedging strategy that is based on loss aversion will only be abandoned when a shift in the nuclear aspirant's reference point occurs during negotiations. To test our theoretical arguments, we conduct an in-depth case study of North Korea's nuclear policies throughout the 1990s and 2000s. The empirical study of the changes in North Korea's negotiating stance during the Agreed Framework negotiations and the Six-Party Talks supports our asymmetric leverage thesis. We conclude with broad policy implications for the non-proliferation regime.

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Bargaining over the Bomb

Cited by 20 publications

References 0 publications

Scientific intelligence, nuclear assistance, and bargaining

Scientific intelligence, nuclear assistance, and bargaining

Do nonproliferation agreements constrain?

Leveraging towards restraint: Nuclear hedging and North Korea's shifting reference points during the agreed framework and the Six-Party Talks

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