Bargaining with the bear: Chancellor Erhard's bid to buy German reunification, 1963–64

Challenging traditional historiography that claims Lyndon B. Johnson's foreign policy was his political weakness, this article aligns itself with recent, more positive assessments of his record 'beyond Vietnam'. President Johnson contributed to the avoidance of a lasting split in the Atlantic alliance despite General de Gaulle's anti-Americanism, the unpopularity of the US engagement in Vietnam, and increasing US calls for 'burden-sharing'. He was able to do this by recognising his own and his country's limitations in external affairs, by relying on the judgement of key advisers, by adopting a calm approach in contrast to de Gaulle's inflammatory behaviour, and by supporting progress toward détente and Ostpolitik. Thus, although transatlantic relations faced major tensions and serious realignment during the Johnson years, they remained relatively stable.

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Alliance Coercion and Nuclear Restraint: How the United States Thwarted West Germany's Nuclear Ambitions

Gerzhoy

2015

International Security

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When does a nucleararmed state's provision of security guarantees to a militarily threatened ally inhibit the ally's nuclear weapons ambitions? 1 The security model of nuclear proliferation argues that by providing extended deterrence to an insecure client, a patron obviates the client's need for indigenous nuclear weapons capabilities. 2 Underpinning this argument is the logic of "nuclear dependence," which posits that clients will prefer to delegate their security to a patron to avoid the risks associated with nuclear acquisition. For clients facing military threats, however, uncertainty about the durability and credibility of a patron's protection means that security guarantees are imperfect substitutes for independent capabilities. As a result, clients are compelled to minimize risks to their survival by pursuing both security guarantees and nuclear weapons of their own.Critics of the security model contend that this indeterminacy in its logic indicates that security guarantees cannot explain nuclear restraint, and that competing causal variables are necessary to account for client states' nuclear choices. In particular, past scholarship has largely turned to domestic factors to explain the choice of external reliance versus nuclear weapons acquisition, including the politico-economic preferences of a country's ruling coalition, the popularity of nonproliferation norms, the psychology of political leaders, and the prevalence of domestic actors with a veto over nuclear decisions. 3 These

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Bargaining with the bear: Chancellor Erhard's bid to buy German reunification, 1963–64

Cited by 3 publications

References 16 publications

Transatlantic relations in the Johnson and Nixon eras: The crisis that didn't happen – and what it suggests about the one that did

Transatlantic relations in the Johnson and Nixon eras: The crisis that didn't happen – and what it suggests about the one that did

A foreign policy success? LBJ and transatlantic relations

Alliance Coercion and Nuclear Restraint: How the United States Thwarted West Germany's Nuclear Ambitions

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