Bargaining without a Common Prior-An Immediate Agreement Theorem

Yıldız, Muhamet

doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00426

Cited by 92 publications

(99 citation statements)

References 24 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Such assumption, while strong, is shared by a number of other papers, for example about bargaining (see, Yildiz, 2003Yildiz, , 2011. Other assumptions would sound plausible as well, for example allowing the k parameter to be heterogeneous among agents or allowing agents to entertain subjective beliefs about the ability of others to correctly observe (or interpret) the actions of their predecessors.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Information redundancy neglect versus overconfidence: a social learning experiment

Angrisani¹,

Guarino²,

Jéhiel³

et al. 2017

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We study social learning in a continuous action space experiment. Subjects, acting in sequence, state their belief about the value of a good, after observing their predecessors' statements and a private signal. We compare the behavior in the laboratory with the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium prediction and the predictions of bounded rationality models of decision making: the redundancy of information neglect model and the overcondence model. The results of our experiment are in line with the predictions of the overcondence model and at odds with the others'.

show abstract

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Information redundancy neglect versus overconfidence: a social learning experiment

Angrisani¹,

Guarino²,

Jéhiel³

et al. 2017

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…In Yildiz (2003), he shows that if the bargaining horizon is short, this optimism can lead to disagreement-the contract zone can be an empty set. If the horizon is su¢ ciently long, however, and people remain su¢ ciently optimistic then immediate agreement may be possible.…”

Section: Theories Of Overcon…dence In Bargainingmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Role of Judicial Discretion in Dispute Settlement

Andreoni

Madoff

2008

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We consider two common modes of judicial resolution: judicial discretion, where the judge or jury has broad discretion in fashioning a remedy, and winner take all where the remedy is pre-determined by the governing substantive law. We analyze these systems in light of the fact that pre-trial bargainers have been shown to have excessive con…dence in their own positions. We …nd theoretically that winner-take-all rules magnify the e¤ects of over-con…dence and diminish the likelihood of settling relative to judicial discretion. We con…rm our model with a laboratory experiment showing signi…cantly fewer pre-trial agreements under winner-take-all. These results imply that increasing judicial discretion in fashioning remedies could increase pre-trial agreements and promote e¢ ciency. This has implications for many areas of law, including donative transfers, property law, patent infringements, and agreements on liquidated damages.

show abstract

“…2 Even when there is uncertainty about strategies in the form of mixed strategies, in order to justify equilibrium analysis, one needs to make similar assumptions, such as mutual knowledge of players' conjectures-which implies that players guess other players' conjectures correctly-or a common prior about strategies (Aumann and Brandenburger (1995)). 3 There are applications on financial markets (Harrison and Kreps (1978), Morris (1996)), bargaining (Posner (1972), Landes (1971), Yildiz (2003Yildiz ( ,2004, Ali (2003) Watanabe (2004) have more substantial self-serving biases about the strategies of others than they do regarding physical reality. Hence, it would be methodologically preferable to model players having biased beliefs about strategic uncertainty whenever they have biased beliefs about the underlying parameters of the real world.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Wishful Thinking in Strategic Environments

Yıldız

2004

SSRN Journal

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract. Towards developing a theory of systematic biases about strategies, I analyze strategic implications of a particular bias: wishful thinking about the strategies. I identify a player as a wishful thinker if she hopes to enjoy the highest payoff that is consistent with her information about the others' strategies. I develop a straightforward elimination process that characterizes the strategy profiles that are consistent with wishful thinking, mutual knowledge of wishful thinking, and so on. Every pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is consistent with common knowledge of wishful thinking. For generic two-person games, Ifurther show that the pure Nash equilibrium strategies are the only strategies that are consistent with common knowledge of wishful thinking. My analysis also illustrates how one can characterize the strategic implications of general decision rules using the tools of game theory.

show abstract

Bargaining without a Common Prior-An Immediate Agreement Theorem

Cited by 92 publications

References 24 publications

Information redundancy neglect versus overconfidence: a social learning experiment

Information redundancy neglect versus overconfidence: a social learning experiment

The Role of Judicial Discretion in Dispute Settlement

Wishful Thinking in Strategic Environments

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About