Bases políticas das transferências intergovernamentais no Brasil (1985-2004)

Abstract

The politics of intergovernmental transfers in Brazil. This article examines the political economy of public resources distribution in Brazil's federal system in 1985-2004. We propose an empirical exercise to analyze how the country's federal governments deal with the tradeoff between the provision of material wellbeing to sub-national governments (the states in our study) and the pursuit of political support from the latter. To identify the determinants of the transfer of resources from the federal government to the states, a set of economic, political, and institutional variables is econometrically tested. Based upon instrumental variables estimation for panel-data models, our estimates indicate that in Brazil the pursuit of political goals prevails over social equity and economic efficiency criteria: higher levels of per capita transfers are associated with the political makeup of governing coalitions, while larger investments in infrastructure and development by the states are associated with a lower amount of per capita resources transferred to sub-national governments. Our findings also suggest a trend toward the freezing of interregional inequalities in Brazil, and show the relevance of fiscal discipline laws in discouraging the use of the administrative apparatus for electioneering.

Alinhamento partidário e demanda por transferências federais no Brasil

“…According to Brollo and Nannicini (2012) and Ferreira and Bugarin (2007), to mention two examples, in the distribution of discretionary resources, the federal government favors municipal allies of the same party or parties that form the national coalition in power, and this is evident on the eve of elections, corroborating the model of political-budget cycles (see also Soares & Melo, 2016). The same occurs in the transfers to state governments (Amorim & Simonassi, 2013).…”

“…The central point of the argument lies in the unequal distribution of preferences and bargaining power between entities at different levels of government (Rodden, 2010). While subnational governments that have more chances to obtain concession from the federal government (because of a significant representation at the national Congress (Amorim & Simonassi, 2013), or capacity to threaten the economy and the territorial unity (Treisman, 1996), the degree of political alignment between levels (as mentioned by the former mayor in the epigraph that illustrates this article), can facilitate negotiations and access to bureaucracy via intraparty channels. Thus, the central government's electoral incentives and factors related to the demand for intergovernmental transfer, are part of the strategies available to subnational governments to raise funds.…”

“…(Fuad Gabriel Chucre [Former mayor of the city Carapicuíba, in São Paulo, Brazil, from the party PSDB] as quoted in Bragon & Nublat, 2007) The statement of the former mayor above summarizes one of the most recurrent findings observed in the literature on distributive politics in Brazil: that the federal government distributes more resources to regions governed by allied parties, and less to regions governed by the opposition at the national level (Amorim & Simonassi, 2013;Bandeira-de-Mello, 2016;Brollo & Nannicini, 2012;Ferreira & Bugarin, 2007;Sakurai & Theodoro, 2014). And while the literature offers lots of documentation on this allocative bias, research on the logistics of the political distribution of resources is scarce.…”

Determinantes das transferências fiscais para as unidades municipais: efeitos da representação desproporcional dos distritos eleitorais brasileiros

“…According to Arretche and Rodden (2004), the distribution of discretionary transfers does not benefit the poorest states, and thus "it is not determined by needs criteria. " In this light, Amorim and Simonassi (2013) and Turgeon and Cavalcante (2014) identify a tendency to maintain interregional inequalities. The transfer of resources to the states seems to be driven more by political factors than the socioeconomic characteristics of the subnational units or criteria to reduce interregional inequalities.…”

“…Existing studies have attempted to identify this connection, for example Amorim and Simonassi (2013), Arretche and Rodden (2004), Gibson, Calvo and Falleti (2004), Soares and Neiva (2011), and Turgeon and Cavalcante (2014). Among the variables affecting direct intergovernmental transfer decisions, there is consensus among the authors cited that overrepresentation of electoral districts has a considerable effect on the distribution of public funds -that is, the states overrepresented in the legislation are those that receive the most benefit.…”