Basic Actions and Individuation

Sandis, Constantine

doi:10.1002/9781444323528.ch2

“…29 But we must do this without making Oedipus' error of mistaking one's handlung for a tat. 30 Not everything we willingly do is done intentionally or on purpose, or vice versa. 31 For Kant, by contrast, what we must take responsibility for is more limited.…”

Section: Hegel On Rational Agency: Oneself In Anothermentioning

confidence: 99%

Kant and Hegel on purposive action

Laitinen¹,

Mayr²,

Sandis³

2020

Philosophy of Action From Suarez to Anscombe

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This essay discusses Kant's and Hegel's philosophies of action and the place of action within the general structure of their practical philosophy. We begin by briefly noting a few things that both unite and distinguish the two philosophers. In the sections that follow we consider these and their corollaries in more detail. In so doing, we map their differences against those suggested by more standard readings that treat their accounts of action as less central to their practical philosophy. Section II discusses some central Kantian concepts (Freedom, Willkür, Wille, and Moral Law). In Section III we take a closer look at the distinction between internal and external action, as found in Kant's philosophy of morality and legality. In Section IV, we turn to Hegel and his distinctions between abstract right (legality), morality, and ethical life, as well as the location of his account of action within his overall theory of morality. We discuss the distinction between Handlung and Tat, and non-imputable consequences. The overall aim of our essay is to shed light on some puzzles in Kant and Hegel's conceptions, and to examine where their exact disputes lie without taking a stand on which philosophy is ultimately the most satisfactory.

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“…29 But we must do this without making Oedipus' error of mistaking one's handlung for a tat. 30 Not everything we willingly do is done intentionally or on purpose, or vice versa. 31 For Kant, by contrast, what we must take responsibility for is more limited.…”

Section: Hegel On Rational Agency: Oneself In Anothermentioning

confidence: 99%

Kant and Hegel on purposive action

Laitinen

¹

,

Mayr

²

,

Sandis

³

2018

Philosophical Explorations

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0

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This essay discusses Kant's and Hegel's philosophies of action and the place of action within the general structure of their practical philosophy. We begin by briefly noting a few things that both unite and distinguish the two philosophers. In the sections that follow we consider these and their corollaries in more detail. In so doing, we map their differences against those suggested by more standard readings that treat their accounts of action as less central to their practical philosophy. Section II discusses some central Kantian concepts (Freedom, Willkür, Wille, and Moral Law). In Section III we take a closer look at the distinction between internal and external action, as found in Kant's philosophy of morality and legality. In Section IV, we turn to Hegel and his distinctions between abstract right (legality), morality, and ethical life, as well as the location of his account of action within his overall theory of morality. We discuss the distinction between Handlung and Tat, and non-imputable consequences. The overall aim of our essay is to shed light on some puzzles in Kant and Hegel's conceptions, and to examine where their exact disputes lie without taking a stand on which philosophy is ultimately the most satisfactory.

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“…Now, in speaking of basic actions different senses of “basicness” might be at issue (Baier, ; Sandis, ). For instance, one could regard as more basic those actions that are first or more easily learned, those that are within the repertoire of every human agent, or those whose descriptions imply the descriptions of others.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Basic actions reloaded

Amaya

¹

2017

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In this article, I examine recent debates concerning the existence and the nature of basic actions. The discussion is structured around four theses, with which Arthur Danto introduced basic actions to contemporary theorists. The theses concern (a) the relationship between agency and causality, (b) the distinction between basic and complex actions, (c) the regress argument for basic actions, and (d) the structure of practical knowledge in the light these actions.

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Basic Actions and Individuation

Cited by 29 publications

References 35 publications

Kant and Hegel on purposive action

Kant and Hegel on purposive action

Kant and Hegel on purposive action

Basic actions reloaded

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