Basic factive perceptual reasons

Schnee, Ian

doi:10.1007/s11098-015-0532-z

Cited by 7 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 37 publications

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“… 48 This feature of the view perfectly fits with infallibilist accounts of knowledge, such as those defended by upholders of the knowledge-based model. A similar view has been defended by Schnee 2016 for basic perceptual reasons to believe. Schnee’s defences of this view from specific criticisms can be applied more broadly to address problems in the present more general model.…”

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confidence: 52%

Justification, Conformity, and the Norm of Belief

Fassio

2019

Dialogue

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According to a popular view in contemporary epistemology, a belief is justified if, and only if, it amounts to knowledge. Upholders of this view also hold that knowledge is the fundamental norm governing belief and that conforming to this norm is both necessary and sufficient for justification. I argue against the claim that mere norm conformity is sufficient for justification. Rather, justification requires norm conformity for sufficient undefeated reasons. An important consequence is the rejection of the claim that conformity to the norm of belief is necessary and sufficient for epistemic justification. I illustrate some interesting consequences of this result.

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confidence: 52%

Justification, Conformity, and the Norm of Belief

Fassio

2019

Dialogue

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“…4 In this way, the knowledge-first version of ED holds that perception provides reasons for belief precisely by directly providing knowledge. Timothy Williamson has argued for a similar idea by 3 For treatment of perceptual reasons, see Comesaña and McGrath 2016, Echeverri 2013, Schnee 2016and Turri 2010 Here Littlejohn adopts Williamson's famous formula "E = K", that is, the view that a subject's evidence set consists of things the subject knows. Of course, this is consistent with the idea that perception provides reasons for perceptual judgments (for example, knowledge that "this cup seems red" or something along those lines (Brueckner 2005(Brueckner , 2008.…”

Section: Disjunctivism: 'Reasons -First ' and 'Knowledge-first 'mentioning

confidence: 99%

Knowledge‐first perceptual epistemology: A comment on Littlejohn and Millar

Bruijn

2022

Philosophical Books

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According to epistemological disjunctivism (ED), ordinary perceptual experience ensures an opportunity for perceptual knowledge. In recent years, two distinct models of this idea have been developed. For Duncan Pritchard (Epistemological disjunctivism, 2012, Oxford University Press; Epistemic angst: Radical skepticism and the groundlessness of our believing, 2012, Princeton University Press), perception provides distinctly powerful reasons for belief. By contrast, Clayton Littlejohn (Journal of Philosophical Research, 41, 201; Knowledge first, 2017, Oxford University Press; Normativity: Epistemic and practical, 2018, Oxford University Press) and Alan Millar (The nature and value of knowledge: Three investigations, 2010, Oxford University Press; Philosophical Issues, 21, 332) argue for a version of ED in terms of a “knowledge first” program, on which perception directly provides knowledge, without relying on antecedent reasons or justification. Specifically, both Littlejohn and Millar argue that “reasons first” ED faces a problematic regress. In this article, I defend “reasons first” ED by arguing that experience provides a type of reason that escapes the regress. I also argue that reasons are a fundamental aspect of ED, especially in its anti‐skeptical stance.

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“…This view about what reasons perception provides is not uncontroversial; for discussion, seeSchnee (2016).…”

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Do affective desires provide reasons for action?

Shaw

2020

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It is widely assumed that desires can contribute to what it is rational for one to do. Some desires rationalise action in virtue of reasons on which they are based. For instance, suppose I learn that the restaurant next door serves the best falafel in town, and I form a desire to dine there for that reason. If I were to act on this desire, my action would be rationalised by that reason. Some philosophers have argued that there are desires that rationalise actions without being based on reasons. Some desires, it is claimed, have the power to provide reasons. This paper focuses on arguments by Ruth Chang and, more recently, by Declan Smithies and Jeremy Weiss, that claim that such desires provide reasons without being based on reasons in virtue of having an affective nature. §2 clarifies the operative notion of desire and outlines the two main accounts of affective desire. §3 clarifies the claim that desires are capable of 'providing' reasons by distinguishing several distinct formulations of the thesis. I then apply them to extant accounts of affective desires to clarify the sense in which such desires provide reasons. §4 evaluates a key argument by Chang that affective desires constitute normative reasons for action. §5 motivates scepticism concerning explanations of why desires are rationally significant that appeal to their conscious phenomenology. I outline an alternative approach that centralises the function of such experiences.

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Basic factive perceptual reasons

Cited by 7 publications

References 37 publications

Justification, Conformity, and the Norm of Belief

Justification, Conformity, and the Norm of Belief

Knowledge‐first perceptual epistemology: A comment on Littlejohn and Millar

Do affective desires provide reasons for action?

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