“…If S's reason (for something X) is that p, then S knows that p, and if S's reasons (for X) are that p and that q and so on, then S knows that p and S knows that q and so on. (Unger, 1975, p. 206) 6 5 A non-exhaustive list of opponents to E=K (or the associated view about reasons for belief ) includes: Arnold (2013), Brueckner (2005, Comesaña and Kantin (2010), Conee and Feldman (2008), Dodd (2007), Dougherty and Rysiew (2013), Dunn (2014), Goldman (2009), Harman (2002, Hawthorne (2005), Hughes (2014), Ichikawa (2013), Jackson (2012), Joyce (2004), Kelly (2008), Littlejohn (2011aLittlejohn ( , 2011bLittlejohn ( , 2012, Logins (2013), McGlynn (2014, Mitova (2015), Neta (2008), Rizzieri (2011), Schiffer (2009), Schroeder (2011), Silins (2005, Turri (2009) andWhitcomb (2008). As far as I can see only the objections from Brueckner (2005), Conee and Feldman (2008), Goldman (2009), Hughes (2014, Joyce (2004), Littlejohn (2011bLittlejohn ( , 2012 and McGlynn (2014) have (at least partly) focused on arguments that have been proposed in favour of E=K, instead of merely pointing to some allegedly implausible consequences of E=K.…”