Basic Needs and Sufficiency

Abstract

This chapter addresses a theory of intergenerational justice that is referred to as needs-based sufficientarianism. According to needs-based sufficientarianism, the present generation ought to enable future generations to meet their basic needs—for example, their needs for drinkable water, food, and healthcare. The authors’ aim is to explain and defend this theory in a programmatic way. First, they introduce what they regard as the most plausible variant of needs-based sufficientarianism. Then, they argue that this variant is superior to several alternative ways of thinking about intergenerational justice. In particular, they defend basic needs as the currency of intergenerational justice and sufficiency as its principle. Their arguments for these claims do not purport to be fully comprehensive nor fully conclusive. Yet, the authors hope that they suffice to show that needs-based sufficientarianism is a major contender, with significant pro tanto advantages over other views.

Basic needs in normative contexts

“…According to these criticisms, BN theories are problematic in that they are (1) paternalistic, (2) materialistic, and (3) passivity‐promoting. I will argue that these criticisms can be met in plausible ways (for further discussion see Brock, 2013 ; Gough, 2014 ; Fardell, 2020 ; Miller, 1999 ; Meyer & Pölzler, forthcoming ; Reader, 2006 ; Wiggins, 2005 ).…”

“…On the assumption of the widespread method of reflective equilibrium (Daniels, 1979 ; Rawls, 1999 ) 17 , this list will not only be an implication of its underlying definition but can also be regarded as a test case for it. In many normative contexts, for example, a rather short list of BN will be helpful, that is, a list that only specifies requirements for a minimally decent life (e.g., Meyer & Pölzler, forthcoming ; Miller, 2007 ). Thus, if a list turns out to be too expansive, then this might be taken as a reason to revise the list's underlying definition rather than to accept that the things entailed by the definition really are BN.…”

“…Here are three further reasons for believing that BN theories can incorporate sufficient respect for people's autonomy (see Meyer & Pölzler, forthcoming ). 23 First, rather trivially, on these theories states are only required to enable people to meet their BN.…”

“…However, as an objection against BN this again does not seem too convincing (see Meyer & Pölzler, forthcoming ). On all plausible specifications of the harm of BN deprivation, the satisfaction of these needs ultimately only matters for nonmaterial reasons, for example, as just mentioned, because it enables persons to realize the (nonmaterial) value of autonomy.…”

“…); many proponents of capability theories occasionally fall back on BN language (e.g., Nussbaum, 2006 , pp. 278–279); and recently, a growing number of researchers have also plausibly reemphasized BN's fruitfulness as distinct from capabilities (e.g., Gough, 2014 ; Meyer & Pölzler, forthcoming ; Pinzani, 2013 ; Traub & Kittel, 2020 ). Understanding the role and potential of BN in normative contexts is thus still important.…”