Bayesian cooperative choice of strategies

Abstract

This paper provides a formal framework within which to study cooperative behavior in the presence of incomplete information, and shows how far the known results in the static cooperative game theory can readily be applied to the proposed framework. The new concepts of Bayesian society, Bayesian strong equilibrium and Bayesian incentive compatible strong equilibrium are introduced and studied.

On the Failure of Core Convergence in Economies with Asymmetric Information

“…• u 1 ((a, b) 20 In this core notion, allocations are required to be measurable with respect to each consumer's private information and, as in Goenka and Shell (1997) and Ichiishi and Idzik (1996), informed consumers in an objecting coalition must be made better-off in each state.…”

Interim core concepts for a bayesian pure exchange economy

“…The negative result is true even for some economies with linear von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions. This negative result makes a contrast to nonemptiness of the Bayesian incentive-compatible ex ante core (see, e.g., Ichiishi and Idzik (1996) for the role of linearity of the utility functions in dealing with Bayesian incentive compatibility). Vohra (1999, Example 2.1, pp.…”

“…Ichiishi and Idzik (1996) introduced this requirement into a generalized core analysis, and defined the ex ante Bayesian incentive-compatible core as the core in the private information case in which each possible coalition designs a private measurable and Bayesian incentive-compatible strategy bundle in the ex ante period.…”

Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey

“…Two agents or linear utility functions are immediate examples 27 (see Ichiishi and Idzik, 1996;Vohra, 1999). Another class of examples has been identified in .…”

“…For instance, agents in a coalition may be forbidden to communicate information in any way, leading to feasible sets for coalitions which are even more restricted than F m S . 19 More interestingly, every individual can be restricted to allocations that are measurable with respect to his own private information, which generates the "private core" (using the terminology of Yannelis, 1991; see also Allen, 1993;Ichiishi and Idzik, 1996;Hahn and Yannelis, 1997;Koutsougeras and Yannelis, 1993). A possible rationale for private measurability is that, under appropriate assumptions, it implies incentive compatibility (see, e.g.…”