Bayesian incentive compatible beliefs

d'Aspremont-Lynden, Claude; Gérard‐Varet, Louis‐André

doi:10.1016/0304-4068(82)90007-6

Cited by 57 publications

(26 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…; 2g if agent i bids and the other members of S bid 0; hence, v (S) 2 3 3 5 , contradicting C(v ) 6 = ;. 10 Hence the grand coalition is not stable in this example.…”

Section: Propositionmentioning

confidence: 96%

“…We assume that for every P , there exists a coalitional equilibrium relative to P and in case of multiple equilibria, we …x a mapping associating a coalitional equilibrium (P ) with every P . 3 We denote as v (S; P ) the expected utility of S at (P ), for every S 2 P , namely…”

Section: Model and Solution Concept 21 From Bayesian Games To Coopermentioning

confidence: 99%

“…By symmetry, if C(v ) 6 = ;, the payo¤ vector in which every agent gets 3 5 must be in C(v ). Let us consider a coalition of the form S = fi; i + 1; i + 3g where + is mod 5, i.e., S contains agent i, a neighbor of agent i and a non-neighbor of agent i.…”

Section: Propositionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values

Biran¹,

Forges²

2011

Games and Economic Behavior

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. We propose a semi-cooperative game theoretic approach to check whether a given coalition is stable in a Bayesian game with independent private values. The ex ante expected utilities of coalitions, at an incentive compatible (noncooperative) coalitional equilibrium, describe a (cooperative) partition form game. A coalition is core-stable if the core of a suitable characteristic function, derived from the partition form game, is not empty. As an application, we study collusion in auctions in which the bidders' final utility possibly depends on the winner's identity. We show that such direct externalities offer a possible explanation for cartels' structures (not) observed in practice. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor mayJEL-Code: C71, C72, D44.

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“…; 2g if agent i bids and the other members of S bid 0; hence, v (S) 2 3 3 5 , contradicting C(v ) 6 = ;. 10 Hence the grand coalition is not stable in this example.…”

Section: Propositionmentioning

confidence: 96%

Section: Model and Solution Concept 21 From Bayesian Games To Coopermentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values

Biran¹,

Forges²

2011

Games and Economic Behavior

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“…The fullrank condition of [9] is necessary for the existence of robust lotteries but not sufficient. Condition B of d'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet [11] is necessary and sufficient for balanced-budget implementation. Both [11] and [9] study environments without information acquisition.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Both [11] and [9] study environments without information acquisition. 3 We discuss the relationship between semi-robust lotteries and Condition B of [11] in Section 4 and the connection between (semi-)robust lotteries and the full-rank condition of [9] in Sections 4 and 5.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%