Bayesian Informal Logic and Fallacy

Korb, Kevin B.

doi:10.22329/il.v24i1.2132

Cited by 33 publications

(34 citation statements)

References 49 publications

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“…To date, there have been detailed Bayesian treatments of the argument from ignorance, circular arguments and slippery slope arguments (Hahn & Oaksford, 2006a, Hahn & Oaksford, 2007, as well as ad populum and ad hominem arguments (Korb, 2004). Furthermore, initial analyses suggest that this kind of Bayesian explanation extends to virtually all of the 20 or so fallacies in the classic catalogue (Hahn & Oaksford, 2006a).…”

Section: Theoretical Background: Normative Approaches To Argumentationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Argument Content and Argument Source: An Exploration

Hahn¹,

Harris²,

Corner³

2009

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Argumentation is pervasive in everyday life. Understanding what makes a strong argument is therefore of both theoretical and practical interest. One factor that seems intuitively important to the strength of an argument is the reliability of the source providing it. Whilst traditional approaches to argument evaluation are silent on this issue, the Bayesian approach to argumentation (Hahn & Oaksford, 2007) is able to capture important aspects of source reliability. In particular, the Bayesian approach predicts that argument content and source reliability should interact to determine argument strength. In this paper, we outline the approach and then demonstrate the importance of source reliability in two empirical studies. These experiments show the multiplicative relationship between the content and the source of the argument predicted by the Bayesian framework.Résumé: L'argumentation est employée couramment dans la vie de tous les jours. Il est donc dans notre intérêt théorique et pratique de comprendre ce qui rend un argument puissant. Un facteur qui semble intuitivement important qui contribue à cette puissance est la fiabilité des sources d'information employées dans un argument. Quoique les approches traditionnelles sur l'évaluation d'un argument soient silencieuses sur ce sujet, l'approche bayesienne peut apporter quelques aspects importants sur l'évaluation de la fiabilité des sources: elle prédit que le contenu d'un argument et la fiabilité d'une source devraient agir un sur l'autre pour déterminer la puissance d'un argument. Dans cet article nous traçons les grandes lignes de cette approche et ensuite démontrons dans deux études empiriques l'importance d'évaluer la fiabilité d'une source d'information. Ces expériences dé-montrent une relation multiplicative entre le contenu et la source d'un argument, qui est prédite par l'approche bayesienne.

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Section: Theoretical Background: Normative Approaches To Argumentationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Argument Content and Argument Source: An Exploration

Hahn¹,

Harris²,

Corner³

2009

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“…This view informs the position (Corner and Hahn 2013) that a Bayesian model of rationality provides the proper account of argumentative rationality. Although Bayesian approaches to argumentation are increasingly prominent (Korb 2003;Hahn and Oaksford 2007;Zenker 2013), consideration of the Bayesian approach and engagement with the position that Bayesian accounts of rationality work for argumentation theory is beyond the scope of the present paper.…”

Section: Dual-process Theories Of Rationality and Cognitionmentioning

confidence: 96%

Argumentation, rationality, and psychology of reasoning

Godden

2015

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This paper locates a common picture of argumentative rationality and identifies some implicit assumptions. Argumentative rationality is contrasted with dualprocess theories of reasoning and rationality prevalent in the psychology of reasoning. I argue that argumentative rationality properly corresponds only with system-2 reasoning in dual-process theories. This challenges the prescriptive force of argumentative norms, if they derive from their descriptive accuracy of our cognitive processes. As a remedy, I propose an activity-based account of reasoning that retains the assumptions of argumentative rationality while recontextualizing the relationship between reasoning as a justificatory activity and the psychological states and processes underlying it.Résumé: On identifie une idée commune et fondamentale de la nature de la rationalité argumentative et une collection d'hypothèses implicites en elle. Ensuite on met en contraste la rationalité argumentative avec les théories de double processus de raisonnement et de la rationalité qui prévalent dans la psychologie du raisonnement. On soutient que la rationalité argumentative correspond bien seulement avec un système-2 de raisonnement dans les théories de double processus. Ce résultat remet en cause la force normative des normes argumentatives, si elles proviennent du tout de leur exactitude descriptive de nos processus cognitifs. Comme un remède, je propose une explication fondée sur l'activité de raisonnement qui retient les suppositions de la rationalité argumentative tout en re-contextualisant la relation entre le raisonnement comme une activité de justification et les états et les processus psychologiques qui sous-tendent cette activité.

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“…, Pn). For these interpretations of the probability calculus see Korb [2004], Hahn and Oaksford [2006a,b]. Godden and Zenker [2016] apply such expressions to study the RSA-criteria of informal logic (see Sect.…”

Section: Logic and Rhetoricmentioning

confidence: 99%

Logic, Reasoning, Argumentation: Insights from the Wild

Zenker

2017

LLP

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Abstract. This article provides a brief selective overview and discussion of recent research into natural language argumentation that may inform the study of human reasoning on the assumption that an episode of argumentation issues an invitation to accept a corresponding inference. As this research shows, arguers typically seek to establish new consequences based on prior information. And they typically do so vis-à-vis a real or an imagined opponent, or an opponent-position, in ways that remain sensitive to considerations of context, audiences, and goals. Deductively valid inferences remain a limiting case of such reasoning. In view of these insights, it may appear less surprising that allegedly "irrational" behavior can regularly be produced in experimental settings that expose subjects to standardized reasoning tasks.

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Bayesian Informal Logic and Fallacy

Cited by 33 publications

References 49 publications

Argument Content and Argument Source: An Exploration

Argument Content and Argument Source: An Exploration

Argumentation, rationality, and psychology of reasoning

Logic, Reasoning, Argumentation: Insights from the Wild

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