Behaving as Expected: Public Information and Fairness Norms

Bicchieri, Cristina; Chávez, Alex E.

doi:10.5771/9783845224350-149

Cited by 23 publications

(45 citation statements)

References 1 publication

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“…Through such signals, hungry individuals should be able to increase the sharing of others. Moreover, sharing can be induced by making social responsibility norms and moral obligations salient (e.g., Bicchieri & Chavez, 2010;Branas-Garza, 2007). Within a community, there is a broad range of norms that can be applied in a specific situation and recent theoretical arguments (DeScioli & Kurzban, 2013) and increasing empirical evidence (Kurzban, Dukes, & Weeden, 2011;Petersen, 2013) suggest that individuals strategically seek to raise attention to specific norms through moral displays.…”

Section: The Psychology Of Hunger: Take and Get Others To Givementioning

confidence: 99%

Social Welfare and the Psychology of Food Sharing: Short‐Term Hunger Increases Support for Social Welfare

Petersen

Aarøe

Jensen

et al. 2013

Political Psychology

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Do politically irrelevant events influence important policy opinions? Previous research on social welfareattitudes has emphasized the role of political factors such as economic self-interest and ideology. Here, we demonstrate that attitudes to social welfare are also influenced by short-term fluctuations in hunger. Using theories in evolutionary psychology, we predict that hungry individuals will be greedier and take more resources from others while also attempting to induce others to share by signaling cooperative intentions and expressing support for sharing, including evolutionarily novel forms of sharing such as social welfare. We test these predictions using self-reported hunger data as well as comparisons of subjects who participated in relevant online studies before and after eating lunch. Across four studies collected in two different welfare regimes-the United Kingdom and Denmark-we consistently find that hungry individuals act in a greedier manner but describe themselves as more cooperative and express greater support for social welfare.KEY WORDS: social welfare, evolutionary psychology, hunger, public opinion, United Kingdom, Denmark Public opinion is the foundation of representative democracy-it drives electoral behavior and forms the basis for government formation. Politicians react to and anticipate changes in public opinion which has an impact on policy, even between elections. This fundamental position of public opinion has naturally given rise to the normative ideal that these opinions are considered and reasoned. Yet, challenges to this ideal have been continuously leveled from empirical research (e.g., Converse, 1964; Zaller, 1992). Most notably, recent studies suggest that public opinion is influenced by factors that ought to be strictly politically extraneous. For example, incumbents have been shown to gain votes if the local football team wins immediately before the election (Healy, Malhotra, & Mo, 2010), and conservative candidates gain if the polling station is located in a church (Rutchick, 2010). Here, we deepen this literature on extraneous factors in public opinion by predicting and demonstrating that people's political attitudes fluctuate over the course of the

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Section: The Psychology Of Hunger: Take and Get Others To Givementioning

confidence: 99%

Social Welfare and the Psychology of Food Sharing: Short‐Term Hunger Increases Support for Social Welfare

Petersen

Aarøe

Jensen

et al. 2013

Political Psychology

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“…However, justice research in the global strategy literature rarely addresses the fact that procedural justice often involves lengthy and thus costly procedures (Ellis et al, 2009) and that it is implemented against a backdrop of subsidiary managers' normative expectations regarding fair procedures (Bicchieri & Chavez, 2010). There are MNCs with a strong procedural justice culture (one where subsidiary managers hold high normative justice expectations) and some where these expectations are generally weaker, and these differences should matter for HQ interventions and their consequences (Roberson & Williamson, 2012).…”

Section: Hq Intervention and The Role Of Procedural Justicementioning

confidence: 99%

The role of procedural justice for global strategy and subsidiary initiatives

Asmussen

Foss

Nell

2019

Global Strategy Journal

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Research Summary The global strategy literature highlights the role of headquarters (HQ) in realizing global integration benefits while enabling independent subsidiary strategic initiatives. We construct a game‐theoretic model of the interaction between HQ and subsidiaries, and, building on procedural justice theory, we analyze the motivational costs that can result from the anticipation or realization of HQ intervention in subsidiary initiatives. We also analyze the implications for MNC‐level value creation when HQ managers, fearing subsidiary managers’ emotion‐based reactions, refrain from intervening. We derive a number of counter‐intuitive results, for example, that good HQ behavior may involve forgoing opportunities for value creation, and that procedural justice systems may sometimes be counterproductive. Managerial Summary Headquarters (HQ) in multinational corporations are required to balance global integration and local autonomy within the organization. This balancing act sometimes requires HQ to intervene in subsidiary matters and to overrule the subunits’ decisions. While an intervention might create integration advantages, it may also have a negative impact on the motivation of subsidiary managers, who might feel that their effort and their decisions are overruled. We focus on such motivational issues and investigate how fair decision‐making processes applied by the HQ influence subsidiaries’ entrepreneurial behavior and their reactions to the overruling. Our findings show that, under specific conditions, HQ need to forgo value‐creating interventions, and that a strong focus on a procedural justice culture within the firm can be detrimental.

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“…, r k with the rewards obtained by the agents in the k times they played N G with norm combination n within a time window [t 0 , t ω ]. Then, we will compute the expected payoff to player i as the discounted average reward to role i within this time window: 5 Initially, each history function h i ∈ H will return an empty sequence of rewards. Consequently, each empirical payoff function ρ i ∈ P will return an undefined value.…”

Section: Computing Norms' Payoffs Empiricallymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…How to synthesise them? Accordingly, much work in the literature in norm research has focused on the problem of norm compliance [24,13,6], and particularly on how to synthesise norms that discourage non-compliant behaviour [6,5]. Along these lines, some works like [2,23,28,4,30] have taken inspiration on the framework of evolutionary game theory (EGT) [29] to understand the process whereby societies come to adopt norms.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Off-line synthesis of evolutionarily stable normative systems

Morales

Wooldridge

Rodŕıguez-Aguilar

et al. 2018

Auton Agent Multi-Agent Syst

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Within the area of multi-agent systems, normative systems are a widely used framework for the coordination of interdependent activities. A crucial problem associated with normative systems is that of synthesising norms that will effectively accomplish a coordination task and that the agents will comply with. Many works in the literature focus on the on-line synthesis of a single, evolutionarily stable norm (convention) whose compliance forms a rational choice for the agents and that effectively coordinates them in one particular coordination situation that needs to be identified and modelled as a game in advance. In this work, we introduce a framework for the automatic off-line synthesis of evolutionarily stable normative systems that coordinate the agents in multiple interdependent coordination situations that cannot be easily identified in advance nor resolved separately. Our framework roots in evolutionary game theory. It considers multi-agent systems in which the potential conflict situations can be automatically enumerated by employing MAS simulations along with basic domain information. Our framework simulates an evolutionary process whereby successful norms prosper and spread within the agent population, while unsuccessful norms are discarded. The outputs of such a natural selection process are sets of codependent norms that, together, effectively coordinate the agents in multiple interdependent situations and are evolutionarily stable. We empirically show the effectiveness of our approach through empirical evaluation in a simulated traffic domain.

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Behaving as Expected: Public Information and Fairness Norms

Cited by 23 publications

References 1 publication

Social Welfare and the Psychology of Food Sharing: Short‐Term Hunger Increases Support for Social Welfare

Social Welfare and the Psychology of Food Sharing: Short‐Term Hunger Increases Support for Social Welfare

The role of procedural justice for global strategy and subsidiary initiatives

Off-line synthesis of evolutionarily stable normative systems

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