To engage with the world, we must regularly make predictions about the outcomes of physical scenes. How do we make these predictions? Recent evidence points to simulation -the idea that we can introspectively manipulate rich, mental models of the world -as one possible explanation for how such predictions are accomplished. While theories based on simulation are supported by computational models, neuroscientific evidence for simulation is lacking and many important questions remain. For instance, do simulations simply entail a series of abstract computations? Or are they supported by sensory representations of the objects that comprise the scene being simulated? We posit the latter and suggest that the process of simulating a sequence of physical interactions is likely to evoke an imagery-like envisioning of those interactions. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we demonstrate that when participants predict how a ball will fall through an obstacle-filled display, motion-sensitive brain regions are activated. We further demonstrate that this activity, which occurs even though no motion is being sensed, resembles activity patterns that arise while participants perceive the ball's motion. This finding suggests that the process of simulating the ball's movement is accompanied by a sensory representation of this movement. These data thus demonstrate that mental simulations recreate sensory depictions of how a physical scene is likely to unfold.