This paper addresses the mechanisms needed to coordinate vertically and horizontally disaggregated actors in electricity distribution systems. The mechanisms designed to coordinate planning, investments, and operations in the electric power sector were designed with minimal participation from either the demand side of the market or distributed energy resources (DERs) connected at distribution voltages. The emergence of DERs is now animating consumers and massively expanding the number of potential investors and participants in the provision of electricity services. We highlight how price signals-the primary mechanism for coordinating investments and operations at the transmission level-do not adequately coordinate investments in and operations of DERs with network infrastructure. We discuss the role of the distribution system operator in creating cost-reflective prices, and argue that the price signals governing transactions at the distribution level must increasingly internalize the cost of network externalities, revealing the marginal cost or benefit of an actor's decisions. Price signals considered include contractual relationships, organized procurement processes, market signals, and regulated retail tariffs. This paper is the second part of a two-part series on competition and coordination in rapidly evolving electricity distribution systems.executing least cost, security-constrained dispatch of generation and typically face inefficient retail tariffs as opposed to market-determined prices. Thus, the emergence of DERs is challenging the structures historically used to coordinate investments in power system infrastructure in the medium and long term, and to coordinate supply and demand to ensure reliable operations of power systems in real time.During the wave of restructuring that swept through the electricity industry in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s, regulators established or sanctioned market constructs in order to ensure efficient pricing and the development of an efficient mix of transmission and generation assets in the short and long run (European Commission, 2009;FERC, 1999; P. L. Joskow, 1996). Today, the emergence of DERs is spurring regulators to engage in analogous debates over how to ensure the efficient utilization of and investment in both DERs and the system's conventional suite of network, generation, demand, and storage resources. Existing industry structures need to be revisited once again, to guarantee that they do adequately achieve these goals. This is the second paper in a two-part series that explores the implications of decentralization and digitization for competition and coordination in electricity distribution systems. Part 1 analyzes the economic characteristics of the distribution-level roles required for efficient planning and operation of the power system and the implications of these characteristics for industry structure, competition, market development, and economic efficiency. Part 2 (this paper) analyzes the pricing mechanisms and institutional arrangements needed to coordi...