Advances in Understanding Strategic Behaviour 2004
DOI: 10.1057/9780230523371_8
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Behavioural Game Theory: Thinking, Learning and Teaching

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Cited by 48 publications
(31 citation statements)
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References 93 publications
(102 reference statements)
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“…This model can produce results similar to the recursive one we report below, and it replaces α and α with τ from the theory of initial conditions so it reduces the entire thinking-learning-teaching model to 26 Sophistication may also potentially explain why players sometimes move in the opposite direction predicted by adaptive models (Rapoport, Lo and Zwick, 1999), and why measured beliefs do not match up well with those predicted by adaptive belief learning models (Nyarko and Schotter, 2002). 27 To truncate the belief hierarchy, the sophisticated players believe that the other sophisticated players, like themselves, believe there are α sophisticates. only two parameters.…”
Section: Sophisticationmentioning
confidence: 73%
“…This model can produce results similar to the recursive one we report below, and it replaces α and α with τ from the theory of initial conditions so it reduces the entire thinking-learning-teaching model to 26 Sophistication may also potentially explain why players sometimes move in the opposite direction predicted by adaptive models (Rapoport, Lo and Zwick, 1999), and why measured beliefs do not match up well with those predicted by adaptive belief learning models (Nyarko and Schotter, 2002). 27 To truncate the belief hierarchy, the sophisticated players believe that the other sophisticated players, like themselves, believe there are α sophisticates. only two parameters.…”
Section: Sophisticationmentioning
confidence: 73%
“…Understanding whether people have correct beliefs about others' behaviour is an important question per se, because the standard equilibrium analysis assumes that people strategise on their beliefs about their counterparts' behaviour (Camerer et al (2004)); and it becomes even more important when it comes to gender differences, since one of the dominant explanations for gender differences in decision-making relies on the assumption that the behaviour of men and women is governed by stereotypes regarding their social roles (Eagly (1987);Brescoll (2011)). In sum, understanding whether there is a correspondence between stereotypes of men and women and their actual behaviour is an important question, with potential consequences in economic and psychological modelling.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In the Sophistication model [44,45] This is an agent of rank 1 reflexion. There is also a feature of the proposed modelplayers of the same rank know about each other and must choose the Nash or quantal response equilibrium.…”
Section: Learning and Teaching Modelsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In the same works ( [44,45]) the teaching model are proposed. The agent believes that his opponents use the learning models and uses it not only to predict their actions, but also to choose a farsighted strategy of teaching opponents.…”
Section: Learning and Teaching Modelsmentioning
confidence: 99%