Behind the EU's Energy and Climate Policy Conundrum: Erroneous Power Toolbox, Deadlocks and the Way Forward

Abstract

This article discusses EU energy and climate policy through the prism of multidimensional power. In so doing, it explores the forms of power EU policy draws from and employs. The article argues that through its gas first policy the EU misused its productive power and failed to shift structural power dynamics, while overplaying its institutional and compulsory power to fulfil its energy/climate goals despite the EU's obvious limitations in the former and impotence in the latter. This mismatch between means and goals points to the need for an alternative power toolbox. This consists in the exercise of productive power to signify clean energy as the new normal; the use of coercive structural and market power to shape and regulate clean energy markets and the increased use of institutional power deriving from a comprehensive energy transition. This power toolbox relaxes the shortcomings of the EU's gas first policy, cements EU energy security and supports the global uptake of transitions to renewable energy.

A systematic bibliometric review of clean energy transition: Implications for low-carbon development

“…Relevant policies involve electricity price standards, emission trading system, clean energy investment policies, and the use of innovative finance tools in clean energy support [14,15,88,89]. Tingey and Webb (2020) [90], Bayulgen (2020) [91] and Proedrou (2019) [92] evaluate the practices of local government in the UK, US, and EU in terms of the clean energy transition. Their results indicate that although most local governments have adopted clean energy policies, the effectiveness of these policies varies substantially.…”

Anthropocene Geopolitics and Foreign Policy: Exploring the Link in the EU Case

“…The EU hence remains tightly entangled in the global and regional gas trade and geopolitical structures. Its continued emphasis on gas supply to ensure its energy security neither bodes well with an ambitious climate agenda nor resonates with a foreign policy that prioritizes effective climate change mitigation (Proedrou, 2020).…”

“…Foreign economic policy targeting third states’ climate practices hence starts from domestic energy transitions that dispose of (the need for) fossil imports and hence undermine global fossil demand limiting exporting states’ upstream activities. This would naturally begin with EU retrenchment from its contemporary emphasis on gas security and geopolitics, including Nord Stream II and gas exploration and pipeline schemes in the Eastern Mediterranean, as they all transcend the already compromised 2050 carbon neutrality horizon (Proedrou, 2020, 2019).…”

“…Along with demand destruction, demand creation is equally important. The substitution of fossil for renewable energy calls for the establishment of a new supply chain to cater for renewable energy materials, infrastructure, facilities, and appliances (Geels, 2014; Proedrou, 2020). Again, the EU can build coalitions with China, Japan, and the United States, together with the emerging powers of the Global South and middle powers, and lead the transition to the new world of renewable energy much faster than is currently the case, to facilitate climate change mitigation to no more than 1.5 °C.…”

The EU's CBAM and Its ‘Significant Others’: Three Perspectives on the Political Fallout from Europe's Unilateral Climate Policy Initiative

“…The EGD is not only the most comprehensive environmental policy framework in the history of the EU, but it also has important international implications and may recast the EU as a global actor (Bongardt and Torres, 2022; Eckert, 2021; Oberthür and Dupont, 2021; Proedrou, 2020). Our research note contributes to this literature by dealing with the EU's global climate policy leadership as a relational concept.…”